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Deconstructing the Epistemic 
Challenges to Mass Atrocity 
Prosecutions 
Nancy Amoury Combs* 
Abstract 
Mass atrocity prosecutions are credited with advancing a host 
of praiseworthy objectives. They are believed to impose 
much-needed retribution, deter future atrocities, and affirm the 
rule of law in previously lawless societies. However, mass atrocity 
prosecutions will accomplish none of these laudable ends unless 
they are able to find accurate facts. Convicting the appropriate 
individuals of the appropriate crimes is a necessary and 
foundational condition for the success of mass atrocity 
prosecutions. But it is a condition that is frequently difficult to 
meet, as mass atrocity prosecutions are often bedeviled by pervasive 
and invidious obstacles to accurate fact-finding. This Article 
deconstructs those obstacles. Isolating fact-finding challenges and 
ascertaining their impact is no mean feat because mass atrocity 
prosecutions are a heterogeneous combination of a variety of 
different kinds of crimes and different kinds of proceedings. Mass 
atrocity prosecutions take place in international courts, domestic 
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courts, and hybrid international/domestic courts. Mass atrocity 
prosecutions encompass international crimes and domestic crimes, 
and they encompass a wide range of horrific acts perpetrated by a 
wide range of individuals, acting in a wide range of contexts. 
Previous scholarship has identified international criminal law as 
a discipline intensely marked by pluralism; this Article contends 
that that same pluralism characterizes the fact-finding challenges 
that confront international criminal prosecutions. Moreover, this 
Article advances the debate by isolating three particularly 
significant factors likely to create factual uncertainty at trial. 
Taken together, this examination produces a startling revelation: 
that the “gold standard” of mass atrocity prosecution—
international criminal tribunal prosecutions of international 
crimes—is at greatest risk for inaccurate fact-finding at trial.  
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I. Introduction 
International criminal law has the potential to be a powerful 
and effective means of deterring mass atrocities and imposing 
well-deserved punishment on those who perpetrate those 
atrocities. However, international criminal law also faces 
unprecedented challenges. Some of these challenges generate 
widespread publicity. The decision of three African states to 
withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), for 
instance, made headlines worldwide,1 as did the high-profile battle 
between the ICC and Kenya’s President and Vice President.2 Other 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Somini Sengupta, As 3 African Nations Vow to Exit, International 
Court Faces its Own Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/africa/africa-international-criminal-
court.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Three nations, all from Africa, have 
announced that they will no longer work with the tribunal, intensifying a 
longstanding debate over whether it is biased against the continent.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). For the ICC, things may get worse before 
they get better. See, e.g., Elias Meseret, African Leaders OK Strategy for Mass 
Withdrawal From ICC, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/0e19488f91bc4ccfad1e167c6c5742d5/african-leaders-ok- 
strategy-mass-withdrawal-icc (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Late last year, South 
Africa, Burundi and Gambia all announced plans to leave the court, leading to 
concerns that other states would follow.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).   
 2. See, e.g., Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial, 
VOA NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-president-
international-criminal-court-not-impartial/3632789.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2018) (“Kenyatta was elected in 2013 as he and his running mate, William Ruto, 
faced criminal charges at the ICC over their alleged roles in post-election violence 
in 2007-2008.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kenya’s 
William Ruto Wins ICC Witness Ruling, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35563556 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
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challenges are less publicized but just as concerning. The challenge 
that forms the focus of this Article is the so-called “epistemic 
critique of international criminal law.”3 That critique can take 
many forms. Some scholars, for instance, accuse international 
criminal judgments of exhibiting selective contextualization;4 
other scholars question the ability of international criminal law to 
create a historical record;5 and still other scholars explore, more 
broadly and philosophically, the limits of the knowledge that we 
can attain about atrocities.6 My own scholarship launched one 
highly pragmatic strand of epistemic criticism by identifying 
pervasive and invidious obstacles to accurate fact-finding in 
international criminal proceedings.7 
                                                                                                     
(detailing the prosecutors’ struggle to build a case against Kenyan President 
Ruto) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Doing Justice to Truth: Taking Stock of the Epistemic Critique of 
International Criminal Tribunals, U. COPENHAGEN (June 9, 2016), 
http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/calendar/2016/doing-justice-to-truth/ (last visited Jan. 
22, 2018) (featuring more than a dozen scholars and practitioners from a broad 
range of disciplines at a two-day conference to address the topic of an epistemic 
critique of the International Criminal Tribunals) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See, e.g., Barrie Sander, Doing Justice to History: The Construction of 
Historical Narratives Within International Criminal Courts (2017) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Institute of International Development Studies), at Part 
Four (‘The Culpability Frame’) (discussing consequences of selectivity both for the 
culpability of the individuals on trial and the broader narratives constructed by 
judges in their judgments) (on file with author). 
 5. See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE 
LAW 79–94 (1997) (“The relation between criminal judgment and historical 
interpretation is problematic in a myriad of ways.”); Timothy William Waters, A 
Kind of Judgment: Searching for Judicial Narratives After Death, 42 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 279, 343 (2010) (arguing that the narrative theory of judicial 
decisionmaking is undermined when a trial does not reach a verdict); Richard 
Ashby Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 909–16 (2005) 
(“[C]ourts are inappropriate venues to construct wide-ranging historical 
explanations of past conflicts.”); see also Nigel Eltringham, The Judgement is Not 
Made Now; The Judgement Will be Made in the Future: Positive Appraisals of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Historical Record among 
Politically Motivated Defence Lawyers (2016), http://humanityjournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/09.-N.-Eltringham-Judgement-Is-not-Made-Now.pdf. 
 6. See Henry Redwood, Power, Knowledge and Ownership—The Archives 
of the ICTR (June 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (highlighting the limits of 
knowledge about mass atrocities even when information about those atrocities 
are contained in massive archives) (on file with author). 
 7. See NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE 
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What neither I nor any other scholar has adequately explored, 
however, are the factors that give rise to these severe fact-finding 
obstacles. Do some prosecutions feature greater factual 
uncertainty and, if so, can we identify and isolate the causal 
factors?  This article will tackle these questions, and in doing so, it 
will reveal the complexity and nuance that surrounds epistemic 
criticisms of mass atrocity prosecutions. This complexity and 
nuance derives largely from the complexity and nuance that 
surrounds mass atrocity prosecutions themselves. Most 
international criminal law scholarship, including my own, focuses 
exclusively on prosecutions of international crimes conducted by 
international courts or hybrid international-domestic courts,8 but 
many other possibilities exist. In addition to international and 
hybrid courts, mass atrocities are also prosecuted in a range of 
different kinds of domestic courts.9 Moreover, some mass atrocities 
                                                                                                     
UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
4 (2010) [hereinafter FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS] (“My study will reveal that 
international criminal trials confront severe impediments to accurate 
fact-finding, impediments that should give rise to serious doubts about the 
accuracy of the trial Chambers’ factual determinations.”). Some other works 
explore these questions as well. See, e.g., Martin Witteveen, Closing the Gap in 
Truth Finding: From the Facts of the Field to the Judge’s Chambers, in 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 383 (Alette Smeulers ed., 2010) (noting such 
fact-finding difficulties as cultural and linguistic barriers with victims of mass 
atrocities, among other issues); Mark Findlay & Sylvia Ngane, Sham of the Moral 
Court? Testimony Sold as the Spoils of War, 1 GLOBAL J. COMP. L. 73, 74 (2012) 
(analyzing the shortcomings of witness testimony in the ICC); John Jackson, 
Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals, 7 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 17, 19 (2009) (arguing “that while the present hybrid of adversarial 
gathering and presentation of evidence combined with its liberal admission may 
satisfy certain minimum guarantees of fairness, it falls short of providing the 
optimal epistemic conditions for ensuring that verdicts are based upon a rigorous 
investigation and testing of the evidence”). 
 8. See, e.g., NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 3 (2007) 
(examining the guilty plea practices of the ICTY, ICTR and Special Panels in East 
Timor); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 5 (identifying fact-finding 
obstacles in ICTR, SCSL and Special Panels trials); Nancy Amoury Combs, Grave 
Crimes and Weak Evidence: A Fact-Finding Evolution in International Criminal 
Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L. J. 47, 55 (2017) (conducting an empirical study of ICTR 
trials); Nancy Amoury Combs, Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in 
International Criminal Sentencing, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (developing 
sentencing theory for international and hybrid tribunals). 
 9. When mass atrocities are prosecuted in the state where the crimes took 
place, they can be prosecuted in that state’s ordinary courts. See STEVEN R. 
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are prosecuted as domestic crimes, whereas others are prosecuted 
as international crimes.10 Finally, mixing and matching takes 
place between the categories. A mass atrocity characterized as a 
domestic crime may be prosecuted in an international court,11 
whereas a mass atrocity characterized as an international crime 
may be prosecuted in domestic court.12 Each of these variations has 
epistemic implications. 
Variations between different sorts of mass atrocities also have 
epistemic consequences. Mass atrocities can comprise a wide range 
of unspeakable acts committed in a wide range of circumstances. 
Certainly, large-scale killings qualify as mass atrocities, but so do 
                                                                                                     
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 169–71, 173–78 (2d ed. 2001) (describing Ethiopian, 
Rwandan and Argentine prosecutions). They can also be prosecuted in specialized 
courts that are created specifically to prosecute mass atrocities. See, e.g., The 
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, HUM. & CONST. RIGHTS (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/statute/section1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, pursuant to 
universal jurisdiction, foreign domestic courts can prosecute mass atrocities that 
occurred in other states. See Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means 
to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 419, 427 (2011) (“[I]f a crime transcends the interest of a single state, 
this supports vesting jurisdiction over the crime to all states.”). 
 10. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS 1 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257773.pdf 
(“[Mass atrocities] may be investigated and prosecuted by the International 
Criminal Court, where it has jurisdiction, but they are also penalized in the 
domestic laws of many countries.”). 
 11. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for instance, is currently prosecuting 
its defendants for crimes under Lebanese law, such as intentional homicide and 
terrorism. See generally Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01I11PTJ, 
Indictment, ¶ 1 (June 10, 2011). Similarly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) had jurisdiction over Sierra Leonean crimes, Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/21246, and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have jurisdiction over Cambodian 
crimes, Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, art. 3, Oct. 27, 2004, ECCC Doc. No. NSIRKMJI004/006 
 12. States frequently provide their courts criminal jurisdiction over 
international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
See Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic 
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 121–22 (2001) (describing several former heads of 
state who were not afforded immunity in their home courts and noting that “these 
developments may reflect the entry of a new era in which domestic prosecutions 
for international crimes will flourish”).  
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widespread rapes, tortures, detentions, and other inhumane acts.13 
Mass atrocities also vary in size and scope. An isolated set of war 
crimes qualifies as a mass atrocity as does a genocide that kills 
many hundreds of thousands. Some mass atrocities are committed 
by state-sponsored armies, whereas others are committed by rebel 
forces. Some mass atrocities are committed during brief internal 
armed conflicts; others are committed during protracted wars 
involving numerous nations, and still others occur during 
ostensible peace-time. Finally, mass atrocities can take place in 
dramatically different locations: for instance, mass atrocities were 
committed on Guantanamo Bay—that is, on the territory of 
arguably the richest, most industrialized nation on the planet.14 
And they were committed in the most desperately poor regions of 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
Mass atrocities and their prosecutions, therefore, are 
characterized by a pluralism that has only just begun to be 
systematically examined.15 This Article contends that that same 
pluralism characterizes the epistemic challenges that confront the 
prosecutions of mass atrocities. In particular, the epistemic 
challenges bedeviling a mass atrocity prosecution are a product of 
a host of factors relevant to the facts and circumstances of the 
atrocity and its prosecution. As these factors combine and coalesce 
                                                                                                     
 13. See U.N., FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: A TOOL 
FOR PREVENTION 27 (2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis
%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf (defining “crimes against humanity” as 
inclusive of many atrocious crimes, including rape, torture, and “severe 
deprivation of physical liberty” via the Rome Statute). 
 14. John Haltiwanger, Torture Used by U.S. Military at Guantanamo Bay 
Despite Being Banned, UN Says, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2017), 
http://www.newsweek.com/torture-used-us-military-guantanamo-bay-despite-
being-banned-un-says-747373 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 15. Most accounts of the pluralism of international criminal law explore 
variations in the prosecutions of mass atrocities. See, e.g., PLURALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014) 
(“The first layer of complexity consists in the fact that [international criminal 
justice] is centered on the international and hybrid criminal courts, bound 
together into a decentralized and hierarchical ‘community.’”). See generally 
Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849 (2004); Volker Nerlich, Daring Diversity–Why There 
is Nothing Wrong with ‘Fragmentation’ in International Criminal Procedures, 26 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777 (2013). 
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in different ways, the epistemic challenges likewise shift and 
transform. 
At the same time, this Article’s detailed exploration of these 
epistemic challenges reveals that three factors stand out as having 
particularly significant epistemic consequences. They are: the 
location of the atrocity,16 the nature of the atrocity,17 and the body 
prosecuting the atrocity.18 Part II addresses the location of the 
atrocity.  It argues that a mass atrocity’s location—and in 
particular the development status of that location—has a dramatic 
impact both on the kinds of evidence available as well as the 
probative value of that evidence. Part III considers various 
descriptive features of the atrocities themselves. Part III first 
documents the way in which the large size and scope of atrocity 
crimes gives rise to evidentiary challenges that do not arise in the 
prosecutions of discrete, isolated crimes committed in the same 
locations. That is, the size and scope of a mass atrocity stands as 
an independent factor driving fact-finding challenges. Part III also 
contends that the characterization of a mass atrocity as an 
international crime, as opposed to a domestic crime, increases 
fact-finding challenges. Finally, Part IV explores the way in which 
different prosecutorial bodies face different epistemic challenges. 
Specifically, Part IV contends that trials in international courts 
and tribunals generally feature more pronounced fact-finding 
challenges than similar trials in domestic bodies. The Article 
concludes by observing that, although each of these factors 
independently gives rise to evidentiary difficulties, they tend to 
coalesce in the current international tribunal prosecutions of 
international crimes.19 That is, international criminal tribunals 
that prosecute international crimes in developing nations face the 
most severe obstacles to accurate fact-finding. 
This conclusion is worrisome. International tribunal 
prosecutions of international crimes in developing nations have 
constituted a core feature—indeed, some would say a necessary 
component—of the much-lauded “justice cascade”20 that has finally 
                                                                                                     
 16. Infra Part II.A. 
 17. Infra Part III. 
 18. Infra Part IV. 
 19. Infra Part V. 
 20. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 5 (2011) (using the term “justice 
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begun imposing accountability on large-scale human rights 
offenders. Indeed, it was through just such international tribunal 
prosecutions that the world saw its first genocide conviction,21 its 
first conviction for the enlistment and conscription of child 
soldiers,22 and its first sitting president brought to justice,23 among 
many other landmarks.24 But the analysis herein suggests that, for 
all of their accomplishments, international tribunal prosecutions 
of international crimes in developing nations are also uniquely 
likely to suffer from the kinds of profound epistemic challenges 
that can seriously undermine efforts to use criminal prosecutions 
to prevent and punish large-scale violence. 
II. Location, Location, Location: The Evidentiary Implications of 
the Place Where the Crime Took Place 
As noted, mass atrocities can vary in countless respects, and 
each variation can have evidentiary implications. For instance, 
forensic evidence may exist to link perpetrators with the mass 
killings that they committed years or decades before,25 but not with 
the mass rapes that they committed at the same time.26 Similarly, 
                                                                                                     
cascade” to mean an “interrelated, dramatic new trend in world politics toward 
holding individual state officials, including heads of state, criminally accountable 
for human rights violations”). 
 21. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 
(Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Judgment]. 
 22. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga 
Judgment]. 
 23. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement 
(May 18, 2012) (finding President Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia guilty for crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, and sexual 
slavery). 
 24. It was likewise in international tribunal prosecutions of international 
crimes in developing nations that the gender-based crimes of forced marriage and 
sexual slavery were first defined and prosecuted. For an example, see Prosecutor 
v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 187–196 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 25. See generally Marija Definis Gojanović & Davorka Sutlović, Skeletal 
Remains from World War II Mass Grave: From Discovery to Identification, 48 
CROAT. MED. J. 520 (2007) (conducting a forensic analysis on human remains 
found in Croatia to determine whether a human rights violation occurred). 
 26. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANUAL ON 
THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE AND OTHER 
232 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (2018) 
the criminal acts of government officials or high-level perpetrators 
may give rise to large quantities of documentary evidence,27 
whereas the criminal acts of non-state actors and/or low-level 
perpetrators may not.28 Although all such variations will have 
some evidentiary consequences, one factor has particularly 
significant evidentiary impact: the location of the crimes. And, 
from an evidentiary point of view, the most influential aspect of 
the location of the crimes is its level of development. Most 
specifically, the development level of a crime’s location can have a 
dramatic influence on both the kinds of evidence that are available 
to prove the crimes and the probative value of that evidence. 
A. Available Evidence 
Trials of crimes that occur in developed nations typically 
feature a variety of different kinds of evidence. Certainly, 
eyewitness testimony stands as a core component of many such 
criminal trials,29 but that testimony is also frequently 
supplemented by an array of non-testimonial evidence.30 
Witnesses in developed nations sometimes videotape or audiotape 
key actions,31 and surveillance cameras often passively document 
                                                                                                     
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, ¶ 223, U.N. Doc. 
HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.04.XIV.3 (2004) (suggesting that no physical 
evidence of rape exists one week after the commission of the crime). 
 27. Christian Axboe Nielsen, Leadership Analysis in International Criminal 
Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: CHALLENGES, LESSONS 
LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES 7 (Adejoké Babington-Ashaye & Aimée Comrie eds., 
2016) (“[L]eadership documentation can also often be a good deal more revealing 
and self-incriminatory than the causal student of international conflicts and 
authoritarian regimes might commonly believe.”). But see Alex Whiting, In 
International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed can be Justice Delivered, 50 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 338 (2009) (“With respect to linkage, the accused commander 
is often far removed from the crimes and there are generally no documents 
directly connecting him to the commission of those crimes.”). 
 28. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 339 (“When the case involves non-state 
actors, the task of proving linkage becomes even more complex.”). 
 29. See, e.g., SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS CASES 28 (2004) (“[E]yewitness testimony accounts continue to 
provide the foundation, and sometimes the only basis, for many prosecutions.”). 
 30. See, e.g., 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON 
EVIDENCE § 1:3 (7th ed. 2016). 
 31. See, e.g., Andrew Rosado Shaw, Note, Our Duty in Light of the Law’s 
Irrelevance: Police Brutality and Civilian Recordings, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
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important events.32 Communications, such as letters, emails, 
phone calls, voicemail messages, and texts, also frequently help to 
prove the elements of crimes, as do other forms of documentary 
evidence, such as records, advertisements, and diaries.33 Even 
when cases turn on the veracity and accuracy of witness testimony, 
non-testimonial evidence can serve to reduce the number of 
contested issues and to corroborate or refute the witnesses’ 
testimony.34 A witness will not be able to convince the judge or jury 
that the defendant accompanied her to a movie theatre, for 
instance, if a surveillance video shows that the witness entered the 
theatre by herself. And phone records documenting numerous calls 
between a defendant and an alleged co-conspirator serve to 
corroborate testimony tying the defendant to the criminal 
activities of the co-conspirator.35 
Those prosecuting crimes in developing nations, by contrast, 
tend to possess far less non-testimonial evidence of the crimes they 
                                                                                                     
POL’Y 161, 162 (2012) (discussing civilians’ use of cell phones to record police 
misconduct); METTE MORTENSEN, JOURNALISM AND EYEWITNESS IMAGES: DIGITAL 
MEDIA, PARTICIPATION, AND CONFLICT 3 (2014) (“As increasing proportions of the 
world’s population are able to disseminate their photographs and videos of 
ongoing conflicts, an unprecedented landslide of visual information has emerged 
within a relatively short time span.”). 
 32. For example, one of the key pieces of evidence identifying the suspects in 
the 2013 Boston Marathon terrorist attack was surveillance camera footage from 
a nearby department store. See generally Sari Horwitz et al., Boston Marathon 
Bombings: Investigators Zero in on Possible Suspect, WASH. POST (April 17, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/boston-marathon-
bombings-investigators-sifting-through-images-debris-for-clues/2013/04/17/a523 
8caa-a 75b-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33.  See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 30, § 1:3 (“[A] common form of 
evidence is documentary evidence such as public records, private writings, 
business records, photographs, maps, and the like.”). 
 34. See id. § 11:7 (“[E]vidence is often relevant because it circumstantially 
corroborates other evidence.”). 
 35. See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 
(2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_ 
cover2.pdf [hereinafter DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS] (“The strongest cases are often 
those in which several different kinds of evidence . . . can corroborate witness 
testimony.”); see also United States v. Munguia, 273 F. App’x 517, 518–19 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s holding that cell phone records be 
admitted as evidence because “the evidence was highly probative as corroboration 
of the co-conspirators’ testimony that they were in contact with [the defendant]”). 
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seek to prove. Certainly, surveillance cameras are less prevalent 
in developing nations,36 and computers and other forms of 
technology are also rarer.37 So, trials of crimes in developing 
locations are less likely to feature audio, video, or cellular evidence. 
Moreover, literacy rates are lower in developing nations—
sometimes dramatically so38—and those who are illiterate are not 
writing letters, keeping written records, or otherwise documenting 
their activities in the way that literate individuals do. For that 
reason, even basic evidence of identity, such as birth certificates, 
are unavailable in some developing countries,39 as is evidence of 
ownership, such as deeds.40 Indeed, records of all sorts, including 
                                                                                                     
 36. Consider that, in 2014, the African surveillance camera market was 
worth approximately $200 million, compared to the global market, which was 
worth over $15 billion. See Josh Woodhouse, Potential in African Video 
Surveillance Market as Market Size Surpasses $200 Million, IHS TECH. (Jan. 30, 
2014), https://technology.ihs.com/485243/potential-in-african-video-surveillance-
market-as-market-size-surpasses-200-million (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. In Sierra Leone, for instance, between 2008 and 2012, only 33% of the 
population used cell phones, and 1.3% used the internet. At a Glance: Sierra 
Leone, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_statistics.html# (last updated 
Dec. 27, 2013) (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 38. Many countries in Western Europe, such as Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom, have had literacy rates at or above 99% for at least a decade. 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010). By contrast, 
developing nations such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, as of 2015, had literacy rates of 47.6%, 48.1%, and 63.8%, respectively. 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2016); see also Edward 
Sawyer & Tim Kelsall, Truth vs. Justice? Popular Views on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 ONLINE J. 
PEACE & CONFLICT RES. 36, 40 (2007) (reporting on a survey of Sierra Leoneans in 
which 45% of those interviewed had either never been to school or had not 
completed primary education). 
 39. For example, only 31% of births are registered in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 49% in the Central African Republic, and 51% in Sierra 
Leone. For further information, see UNICEF, TABLE 9: CHILD PROTECTION (2011), 
https://www.unicef.org/protection/Table_9_child_labour.pdf. 
 40. See Greenville Barnes et al., Land Registration Modernization in 
Developing Economies: A Discussion of the Main Problems in Central/Eastern 
Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, 12 URISA J. 27, 28–30 (2000) (noting 
that “[i]n many cases, [land] transfers are not recorded by following legally 
defined and documented procedures”). 
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employment, banking, and medical, can be hard to come by in 
developing societies.41 
For this reason, the evidence used to prove mass atrocities 
perpetrated in developing nations can look very different from the 
evidence used to prove mass atrocities perpetrated in developed 
nations. A comparison of the evidentiary bases for convictions at 
the first two modern international criminal tribunals—the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—
provides a striking display of these differences. Indeed, the 
differences are particularly notable because the tribunals were 
similar in so many important respects. The tribunals were 
established at about the same time to prosecute crimes that 
occurred at about the same time.42 The tribunals were established 
through the same mechanism—a U.N. Security Council 
Resolution—and were structured in the same way.43 The tribunals 
initially shared a Prosecutor;44 they continued to share an Appeals 
Chamber,45 and they utilized virtually the same procedural rules.46 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Leora Klapper et al., Income Biggest Barrier to Banking in 
Developing Countries, GALLUP (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/159380/income-biggest-barrier-banking-developing-countries.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Approximately one in five adults cites lack of proper 
documentation as a barrier, regardless of income level. Many banks require proof 
of permanent residence or wages slips, and in countries where large numbers of 
people are informally involved in the economy, this documentation can be difficult 
to come by.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Christopher Cramer, Carlos Oya & John Sender, Lifting the Blinkers: A New View 
of Power, Diversity, and Poverty in Mozambican Rural Labour Markets, in RURAL 
WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 95 
n.14 (Carlos Oya & Nicola Pontara eds., 2015) (reporting that in Mozambique, 
between 42% and 80% of middle-scale agricultural farms employ temporary 
workers, “who by definition are not officially registered for the purposes of 
employment records”). 
 42. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International 
Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 
349, 350–51 (2006). 
 43. See id. at 354 (“Similar to the ICTY . . . [the U.N. Security Council 
passed] Resolution 955 authori[zing] the creation of the ICTR . . . .”). 
 44. See S.C. Res. 955 art. 15, ¶ 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] 
(“The Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall 
also serve as the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”).  
 45. See id. art. 13(3). 
 46. Compare ICTY, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (2013) (as 
amended), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure 
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However, despite these many similarities, the evidentiary bases of 
the tribunals’ judgments differed significantly. To be sure, witness 
testimony formed a key component in both tribunals’ trials,47 but 
for the ICTR, it formed virtually the exclusive basis for the 
tribunal’s convictions.48 The same is true for two other tribunals 
that prosecuted crimes in developing nations. In particular, I have 
carefully examined the evidentiary bases of trials at the ICTR, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes in East Timor (Special Panels), and I found that 
very little non-testimonial evidence was submitted and almost 
none of it was central to any factual finding.49 By contrast, the 
ICTY, which prosecuted crimes committed in the more developed 
former Yugoslavia, collected massive quantities of documents and 
                                                                                                     
evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf, with ICTR, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
(2015) (as amended), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-
library/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf. 
 47. See Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crimes Trials:  
Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 219 (2014) 
(providing statistics on the ICTY’s use of witnesses). 
 48. See Göran Sluiter, The ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 962, 963 (2005); see also Joanna Pozen, Note, Justice Obscured: The 
Non-Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities in ICTR Trials, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 281, 281 (2006) (comparing the ICTR to other international tribunals that 
relied more on documentary evidence rather than witness testimony). 
 49. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 12–14 (noting that 
the vast majority of evidence used at the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels was 
witness testimony). Prosecutions at the ECCC, by contrast, have featured 
non-trivial quantities of documentary evidence because the Khmer Rouge 
documented many of their atrocities. See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., BEYOND 
REASONABLE DOUBT: USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 5 (2012), https://www.law.berkeley. 
edu/files/HRC/HRC_Beyond_Reasonable_Doubt_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND 
REASONABLE DOUBT] (“[T]he Court has relied heavily on documentary evidence, 
including lists of prisoners who were executed, photographs, and annotations 
written on ‘confessions’ of prisoners by their torturers.”); Prosecutor v. Kaing 
Guek Eav “Duch,” Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶ 56 (July 26, 
2010) [hereinafter Duch Judgment] (“Over the course of the trial, approximately 
1,000 documents were put before the Chamber and subjected to examination.”). 
But the ECCC is unusual in this regard for modern tribunals.  
In a forthcoming piece, I document the way in which criminal evidence is 
changing in developing societies. In particular, in recent years, prosecutors of 
mass atrocities in developing nations have begun gaining access to greater 
quantities of non-testimonial evidence. Nancy Amoury Combs, The New Face of 
International Criminal Evidence (forthcoming). 
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other non-testimonial evidence,50 and it made good use of it.51 
Virtually all ICTY cases featured some highly-probative 
non-testimonial evidence, and cases that involved high-level 
political and military leaders featured a great deal of it.52 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Alexander Zahar, Pluralism and the Rights of the Accused in 
International Criminal Proceedings, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 224, 233–36 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014) (discussing 
the “sheer volume of evidence” during ICTY proceedings); see also Marko Divac 
Öberg, Processing Evidence and Drafting Judgments in International Criminal 
Trial Chambers, 24 CRIM. L.F. 113, 117–18 (2013) (“In the Popović and others 
case . . . more than 58,000 exhibit pages, not counting translations, were 
admitted into evidence at trial . . . .”); Nielsen, supra note 27, at 15 (noting that 
at the ICTY, the “only persons who could reasonably hope to digest and master 
document collections consisting of potentially hundreds of thousands of pages 
were those analysts whose full-time job was to do so”). 
 51. Nielsen, supra note 27, at 8 (noting that personnel and financial records 
“featured prominently in the prosecution of the genocide committed in 
Srebrenica”). 
 52. See, e.g., Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale 
Crimes at the International Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 539, 554–55 (2006) (describing minutes of the Municipal assembly relied on 
in the Stakić trial, the recordings of President Tudjman’s meetings relied on in 
the Naletilić and Martinović trials, and the transcripts of intercepts relied on in 
the Krstić trial). ICTY Trial Chambers benefited from considerable documentary 
evidence found in military archives. For instance: 
[I]n the Galić and Dragomir Milošević cases, detailed military 
documents as to the movements of armed forces and orders given to 
conduct military activities proved crucial to establishing the pattern of 
shelling and sniping in Sarajevo. In Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, military 
documents were used in the case against two senior military leaders 
for their failure to prevent the torture and killing of hundreds of 
prisoners of war evacuated from the Vukovar hospital. Likewise in 
the Stakić, Brđanin and Krajišnik cases, minutes of meetings of 
municipal, regional and State political bodies proved important in 
establishing the existence of joint criminal enterprises at leadership 
levels to ethnically cleanse large parts of Bosnia.  
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 89 (2009–2010), https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-memoranda/226-Annual-Report-
2009-2010. Videos also proved an important source of probative evidence at the 
ICTY. In Kupreškić, for instance, international troops apparently visited a 
massacre site a few hours after the crimes were perpetrated and filmed the 
destruction they found. Id. Similarly, in Krstić, prosecutors submitted the video 
from a TV interview of the defendant which showed buses removing Bosnian 
Muslim refugees from Potočari right behind the defendant. Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶ 348 (Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Krstić 
Judgment]. The video contradicted the defendant’s claim that he was only in 
Potočari for a brief period and neither saw nor heard anything alerting him to the 
ongoing removal of Bosnian Muslim refugees. Id. 
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Prosecutions that rely almost exclusively on witness 
testimony feature greater factual uncertainty for the simple reason 
that the accuracy of witness testimony is frequently uncertain. 
Although eyewitness testimony used to be considered a 
particularly reliable form of evidence, a wide range of field 
experiments in recent years have demonstrated the frequent 
fallibility of eyewitness perception.53 And the inaccuracies are not 
confined to field experiments. In the United States, DNA testing 
has confirmed the problematic nature of eyewitness testimony by 
showing that nearly 80% of American wrongful convictions can be 
attributed to eyewitness error.54 This research, therefore, suggests 
the unsurprising conclusion that fact-finding based solely on 
eyewitness testimony is less likely to be accurate than fact-finding 
that is additionally supported by non-testimonial evidence.55 
B. Problematic Features of Available Evidence 
The previous section indicates that the location of the mass 
atrocity influences the kinds of evidence that are available to prove 
the mass atrocity. More particularly, it suggests that prosecutions 
                                                                                                     
 53. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: 
THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 8–13 (1995) (describing field 
experiments that show high likelihood of inaccuracies in eyewitness 
identifications); Douglas J. Narby et al., The Effects of Witness, Target, and 
Situational Factors on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 23, 24–48 (Siegfried L. Sporer et al. eds., 1996) 
(analyzing the factors that influence a witness’s ability to perceive information 
correctly and store the information in their memory); Brian L. Cutler et al., 
Conceptual, Practical, and Empirical Issues Associated with Eyewitness 
Identification Test Media, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 163, 166–181 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994) (discussing 
three controlled experiments that tested eyewitness identification accuracy); see 
also Public Prosecutor v. Joseph Mpambara, Case Nos.  09/750009-06 and 
09/750007-07, Judgment, Chapter 6, ¶¶ 7, 8 (District Court of The Hague, The 
Netherlands Mar. 23, 2009) (summarizing research).  
 54. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011); Deborah Davis & Elizabeth Loftus, The 
Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from the Past and Projecting 
into the Age of Social Media, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769, 770 (2012). 
 55. Cf. DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS, supra note 35, at 5 (quoting an interview 
originally broadcasted on Radio Netherlands Worldwide between Franck Petit 
and former ICC Judge Bruno Cotte, where it was noted that witness testimonies 
are “often fragile”). 
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of mass atrocities occurring in developing nations face greater 
fact-finding challenges because they are forced to rely more heavily 
on eyewitness testimony. This section suggests that the location of 
the crime not only influences the quantity and kinds of available 
evidence, but also its probative value. To be sure, the inherent 
unreliability of witness testimony transcends location. That is, 
there is no reason to believe that eyewitness testimony of crimes 
in developing nations is any more or less reliable than eyewitness 
testimony of crimes in developed nations.56 However, there is 
reason to believe that eyewitness testimony of crimes in developing 
nations may be less detailed than eyewitness testimony of crimes 
in developed nations. 
After reviewing thousands of pages of trial transcripts relating 
to international crimes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, 
I discovered that many witnesses from those locations failed to 
provide fact-finders with information that is highly relevant to 
proving or disproving the criminal charges. For instance, many 
witnesses were unable or unwilling to date the events they 
witnessed with any sort of precision;57 many were unable or 
unwilling to estimate distances or provide other estimations;58 and 
many were unable or unwilling to read maps or make use of 
sketches, photographs, or other two-dimensional representations 
of crime scenes or other locations.59 Finally, many were unfamiliar 
with the kinds of details that might be useful to fact-finders, such 
as the make and model of a car or the type of weapon used in an 
attack.60 To be sure, many witnesses in these trials were willing 
and able to provide such information. Moreover, witnesses from 
every location in the world sometimes fail to answer some of the 
questions put to them on the witness stand. That said, the types of 
                                                                                                     
 56. Dr. John Charles Yuille, a Canadian forensic psychologist who testified 
as an expert in the Ntaganda case, opined for instance, that “there is no evidence 
that basic memory processes are affected by culture. Culture can influence what 
is remembered and how the memory is described but, as far as we know, culture 
does not impact the underlying memory processes.” Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, 
ICC-01/04-02/06-T-87-ENG, Transcript, at 6 (Apr. 21, 2016). 
 57. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 24–27. 
 58. See id. at 27–36; see also Witteveen, supra note 7, at 397 (recalling an 
interview with a witness who estimated a distance to be two kilometers when it 
was in fact 100 kilometers).  
 59. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 36–38. 
 60. See id. at 38–39. 
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questions that the witnesses in my study failed to answer and the 
frequency with which they failed to answer them were notable. In 
particular, my research suggested that Rwandan, Sierra Leonean, 
and East Timorese witnesses frequently failed to convey the kind 
of information that is “crucial to the Trial Chamber’s ability to find 
facts and assess credibility.”61 
As noted in subpart A, a cursory comparison between ICTY 
and ICTR trials showed that ICTY convictions were based on a 
wider range of different kinds of evidence than ICTR convictions. 
Similarly, as relevant here, a cursory comparison between witness 
testimony at the ICTY, on the one hand, and witness testimony at 
the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels, on the other, shows a notable 
difference in the quantity of information the two sets of witnesses 
conveyed. I must acknowledge that I reviewed far fewer ICTY 
transcripts than ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels transcripts. But 
I did review enough to convince me of a qualitative difference 
between the two sets of witness testimonies. By and large, ICTY 
witnesses answered the who, what, where, and when questions 
that were asked of them. Many ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels 
witnesses did as well, but a far greater proportion than at the ICTY 
did not. 
Although a host of factors undoubtedly drive the differences 
between the two sets of witness testimonies, there is good reason 
to believe that the differing development levels in the relevant 
countries played a substantial role. Certainly, many of the 
Rwandan, Sierra Leonean, and Timorese witnesses who failed to 
answer questions on the stand explained that failure by pointing 
to their illiteracy or lack of education. Take, for example, the Sierra 
Leonean witness, who described himself as just “a primitive man 
from the bush,”62 or the Timorese witness, who observed that he 
“might have known the right words” if he had attended school,63 
among many similar witnesses.64 Other witnesses maintained that 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 44. 
 62. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 25 
(June 16, 2004). 
 63. Los Palos Case Notes, July 27, 2001, at 83. 
 64. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 
5976 (Mar. 13, 2008) (quoting a witness that stated during trial, “I told them that 
I am not a learned—I’m not educated”); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 74 (June 21, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript, 
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they could not estimate distances because they had never learned 
units of measurement,65 and they could not identify locations or 
landmarks on a map or sketch because they had never been asked 
                                                                                                     
June 21, 2004] (transcribing a witness stating, “I’m not learned so I didn’t record 
it. Those who are learned, you know, those are the people who record things on 
paper, but I am not learned”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-
T, Transcript, at 34 (Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript, Apr. 8, 2005] (“I 
do not know types of guns and I have not been to school. How would I be able to 
know these names.”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 
Transcript, at 21, 36 (June 28, 2005) (quoting a witness claiming that he did not 
understand writing he observed due to his lack of education); Prosecutor v. Brima 
et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 51 (July 14, 2005) [hereinafter 
Brima Transcript, July 14, 2005] (“I can’t recall because I am not literate, I can’t 
write. In fact, when the night comes and the day comes I can’t count anything. 
Since I was born I have never been to school. I know nothing.”); Prosecutor v. 
Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71, Transcript, at 10 (Sept. 15, 2003) (“You 
know, I’m a peasant, I’m a farmer, so in my conditions I wouldn’t be able to give 
you the models of or makes of cars.”); Lolotoe Case Notes, Apr. 9, 2002, at 4; Los 
Palos Case Notes, July 12, 2001, at 18; id., July 23, 2001, at 55; id., July 27, 2001, 
at 83; id., July 16, 2001, at 25; id., Aug. 9, 2001, at 142, 143; id., Aug. 21, 2001, at 
179; id., Aug. 22, 2001, at 192; id., Jan. 10, 2001, at 319. 
 65. See Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71, Transcript, at 
22 (Sept. 29, 2003) (“I cannot give the distance in terms of kilometres because I 
haven’t been to school.”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Transcript, at 25 (Oct. 24, 1997) (responding that, when asked the distance to a 
nearby river, “I do not know. That would be known by somebody who has been to 
school”); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Transcript, at 29 (July 
19, 2001) (“I have already told you that I am not in a position to estimate, say, in 
terms of metres. I am talking about metres, but I don’t really know what that 
represents.”); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 
31 (Mar. 8, 2005) (“Q. How long does it take you to walk one mile? A. I’ve never 
walked that mile, never. I don’t know.”); Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-
74-T, Judgement, ¶ 296 (Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Karera Judgment] 
(summarizing testimony in which witness maintains that he does not understand 
the metric system and can estimate only by “paces”); Los Palos Case Notes, July 
27, 2001, at 84 (“I don’t know what 100 meters is, I only found out when a 
journalist told me.”); Los Palos Case Notes, July 30, 2001, at 94 (“I really don’t 
know about meters.”); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71, 
Transcript, at 22–23 (Sept. 16, 2003) (“I am an ordinary person, so how do you 
want me to measure in metres?  Maybe you should better put that question to 
somebody who is an agronomist.”); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-
03-01-T, Transcript, at 7620 (Apr. 15, 2008) (featuring a witness who was unable 
to estimate distance by means of football fields); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7738–39 (Apr. 16, 2008) (featuring a witness who 
was unable to estimate distance by units of measurement). Whereas distance 
estimations frequently proved challenging for ICTR, SCSL and SPSC witnesses, 
a cursory look at ICTY transcripts suggests that it did not bedevil that Tribunal’s 
witnesses to nearly the same degree. See, e.g., Prosecution v. Lukić, Case No. IT-
98-32/1, Transcript, at 305, 348 (July 10, 2008) (estimating distances in meters). 
242 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (2018) 
to do so before.66 Given that Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor 
had low literacy and education rates, particularly when their mass 
atrocities occurred,67 these explanations seem plausible. Witnesses 
from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, by contrast, were 
dramatically more likely to be literate and to have completed 
primary and secondary schools.68 Consequently, it is not surprising 
that they were more often able to convey to the ICTY the kinds of 
basic factual information that ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels’ 
witnesses sometimes failed to provide. 
It goes without saying that the failure to provide such 
information impairs a court’s ability to find accurate facts. In 
previous scholarship, I have identified the specific kinds of 
fact-finding challenges that arise when questions involving 
dates,69 distances,70 and physical locations71 go unanswered. These 
difficulties have an especially negative impact on a defendant’s 
ability to contest the charges against him. As I have observed 
elsewhere: 
A vague account devoid of details is an account that cannot be 
effectively challenged. When a witness cannot date the events 
she witnessed, the witness prevents the defendant from 
presenting an alibi. When a witness cannot name the make of 
the defendant’s car, then the witness’s account cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, 
Transcript, at 130 (Feb. 13, 2002). 
 67. Sierra Leone’s literacy rate in 2000 was just 31%, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2000), and East Timor’s in 2001 was 38%, 
Timor-Leste, UNESCO INST. FOR STATS., http://uis.unesco.org/en/ country/TL (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Just 
before the genocide, in 1991, Rwanda’s literacy rate was 58%, Rwanda, UNESCO 
INST. FOR STATS., https://en.unesco.org/countries/ rwanda (last visited Jan. 22, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In 1997, approximately 
24% of Rwandans had completed primary school, U.N. DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999: RWANDA 33 (1999), 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/260/hdr_ 1999_en_nostats.pdf.  
 68. In 1994, the literacy rate in the former Yugoslavia was 90%, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (1994), and about five years after the 
war ended, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia all had literacy rates of between 96 and 
98 percent, Background Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE ARCHIVE 
(2009), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 27. 
 70. Id. at 33. 
 71. Id. at 37–38. 
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undermined by evidence showing that the defendant drove a car 
of a different make. When a witness is unable to say for how 
long the rebels occupied his village, then the witness’s 
testimony cannot be inconsistent with that of another witness 
who might estimate a shorter or longer occupation. And when a 
witness professes not to understand maps or photographs, the 
witness renders the defense unable to prove that she was never 
even at the scene of the crime. In other words, all manner of 
innocent inaccuracies as well as deliberate lies can be concealed 
through a witness’s plausible claim that he is unable to answer 
a question.72  
III. The Size, Scope, and Legal Characterization of the Crime 
The previous Part revealed that the location of the crimes has 
important evidentiary implications for mass atrocity prosecutions. 
Specifically, prosecutions of mass atrocities in developing nations 
must rely more heavily on testimonial evidence, which itself 
renders the resulting fact-finding less reliable.73 In addition, the 
testimonial evidence in those trials tends to be somewhat less 
informative than testimonial evidence regarding crimes 
perpetrated in developed nations.74 Location, therefore, is a highly 
relevant factor driving international criminal law’s epistemic 
challenges. But it is not the only factor. If it were, then 
prosecutions of domestic crimes in developing nations would 
feature fact-finding impediments similar to those appearing in 
mass atrocity prosecutions.75 To be sure, prosecutors of domestic 
crimes in developing countries do face many challenges, but the 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 44. 
 73. Supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 74. Supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 75. I have not found descriptions of such difficulties in the literature and 
have no reason to think that they exist. 
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most notable appear to stem from lack of funding, lack of security, 
and corruption,76 rather than from evidentiary deficiencies.77 
For that reason, this Part explores a second significant factor 
that drives fact-finding challenges in mass atrocity prosecutions, 
namely the nature of the crimes being prosecuted. Subpart A 
describes the way in which the large size and scope of mass atrocity 
crimes gives rise to substantial evidentiary difficulties whereas 
subpart B considers the impact of the legal characterization of 
mass atrocities as international or domestic crimes. 
A. Size Matters: The Fact-Finding Implications of Large-Scale 
Criminality 
Mass atrocity prosecutions, by definition, involve large-scale 
criminality; that is, they involve crimes that take place in the 
context of hundreds or thousands of other similar crimes.78 Finding 
accurate facts about crimes that are embedded in large-scale 
criminality is more difficult than finding accurate facts about 
discrete, isolated crimes. On the one hand, this conclusion may 
seem obvious; that is, it goes without saying that a crime involving 
100 victims presents a more complex (and probably more 
uncertain) evidentiary picture than a crime involving one victim.  
                                                                                                     
 76. See MOHAMED SUMA, SIERRA LEONE: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 103–04 (2014), http://issat.dcaf.ch/download/48039/758786/Sierra% 
20Leone%20Justice.pdf (discussing lack of interpreters and delays); 1 CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 4 (Graeme R. Newman et al. eds., 2011) (finding 
that most rape cases in Angola “never reach prosecution stage because of limited 
investigative resources, low level forensic capabilities, and an ineffective judicial 
system”); id. at 35–36, 39 (detailing challenges facing the criminal justice system 
of Central African Republic, such as vigilante justice that results from the 
population’s lack of confidence in law enforcement and the judiciary); CTR. FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY & THE RULE OF LAW, HARROWING TRIALS: TIME TO BRING CLOSURE 
ON PROLONGED TRIALS FOR ACCUSED PERSONS IN SIERRA LEONE’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 4–5 (2015) (calling on the state to “provide more resources to the justice 
system, particularly the judiciary to be able to carry out its functions effectively 
and efficiently”). 
 77. But see SUMA, supra note 76, at 82, 104, 106 (discussing the implications 
of witness intimidation, inadequate witness protection mechanisms, and the 
burdens that inefficient Preliminary Investigation imposes on travelling 
witnesses in Sierra Leone). 
 78. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 335 (“Sometimes war crimes occur in 
isolation, but generally they occur systematically or on a mass scale, either in the 
context of armed conflict or the disintegration of society.”). 
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But the enhanced fact-finding challenges involved in 
prosecuting mass atrocities extend far beyond that self-evident 
fact. In particular, most mass atrocities occur within certain 
contexts and display certain features, and it is these contexts and 
features that create many fact-finding challenges. What are these 
facts and features? First, mass atrocities usually take place either 
during an armed conflict or, if in peacetime, then at the hands of a 
repressive government. Second, mass atrocities usually are 
perpetrated by large numbers of offenders. Sections 1 and 2 will 
address these features in turn. In doing so, they highlight the 
enhanced fact-finding challenges that attend mass atrocity 
prosecutions as compared to prosecutions of isolated crimes. 
Section 3 will show how the fact-finding obstacles resulting from 
these contextual features combine with the location-based 
obstacles identified in Part I to create unique, additional 
impediments to accurate fact-finding. Finally, section 4 will 
explore the different fact-finding challenges that attend mass 
atrocities of different sizes and scopes. 
1. The Context Surrounding Mass Atrocities: Armed Conflicts, 
Obstructionist Governments, and Evidentiary Implications 
Mass atrocities occur during armed conflicts or as components 
of large-scale human rights violations. As a consequence, those 
who investigate mass atrocities frequently confront three obstacles 
that subsequently cause fact-finding uncertainty at trial: 
governmental interference with investigations, inadequate 
security in the region, and delay-induced destruction and 
degradation of evidence. The impact of the latter two factors 
depends largely on the timing of the prosecutions, which I will 
discuss in subsection a. Specifically, prosecutions can be 
undertaken while the conflict is still underway or while 
perpetrators or other parties who have a stake in the prosecutions 
remain in power. Alternatively, prosecutions can be delayed until 
the conflict has ended or a regime change has put the authors of 
the atrocities out of power. Each option leads to unique fact-finding 
challenges, as this section will detail. The third obstacle—
governmental interference with investigations—frequently 
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transcends the timing of the prosecutions, so it will be considered 
in subsection b. 
a. Now or Later: The Dangers of Contemporaneous Prosecutions 
Versus the Losses Incurred by Delayed Prosecutions 
As noted, mass atrocities generally take place in the context of 
an armed conflict or some other large-scale societal rupture. When 
prosecutors or defense counsel seek to investigate the crimes 
before the region has stabilized, they typically find it difficult to 
obtain high-quality evidence. Investigators may not be able to 
travel to crime sites at all.79 When ICC investigators first began 
their investigations into crimes in the DRC, they could not visit the 
eastern part of the country due to security concerns,80 and early 
ICC investigations in Libya were similarly impeded.81 Even when 
the instability is not so grave as to entirely prevent investigations, 
it can impede forensic activities82 and deter potential witnesses 
                                                                                                     
 79. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 6 (highlighting the 
“operational challenges” of the timely collection of evidence after an atrocity, 
“including the need to balance security risks with the need for timely evidence 
collection”); DIGITAL FINGERPRINTS, supra note 35, at 3 (“In the aftermath of 
atrocities, investigators may be restricted from collecting evidence because of 
ongoing violence or an inability to access crime scenes.”); Peggy O’Donnell, Using 
Scientific Evidence to Advance Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court 
10 (unpublished workshop paper) (on file with author) (describing the security 
assessment the ICC undertakes to determine whether to send investigators to a 
crime site). Obviously, when investigators are unable to visit the crime sites, they 
will be unable to discover certain forensic evidence or to interview local witnesses. 
See Whiting, supra note 27, at 335–36 (noting that lack of access to crime scenes 
after an atrocity is one of the major logistical challenges that prosecutors must 
overcome to bring charges against perpetrators). See generally CHRIS MAHONY, 
THE JUSTICE SECTOR AFTERTHOUGHT: WITNESS PROTECTION IN AFRICA (2010). 
 80. See Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learned 
from the Lubanga Judgment, 11 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30, 41–42 (2013). 
 81. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEVENTH 
REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 11 (May 
26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/otp_report_lib_26052016-
eng.pdf (“The Office underscores that due to the prevailing instability and current 
security situation, it is impossible for investigators to undertake investigative 
activities in Libya.”). 
 82. See JEAN M. MORGAN, PROVING GENOCIDE: THE ROLE OF FORENSIC 
ANTHROPOLOGY IN DEVELOPING EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
GENOCIDE 14–15 (2011) (unpublished thesis, Florida State University) (on file 
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from talking to investigators.83 In certain situations, for instance, 
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has had to go to extraordinary 
lengths to approach potential witnesses without exposing them. 
These efforts have included “identify[ing] safe sites for interviews; 
secur[ing] discreet transportation for investigators and witnesses; 
provid[ing] for the contingency of moving witnesses to safe 
locations without attracting attention; and even check[ing] the 
relationships of drivers and hotel owners with the suspects.”84 As 
one ICC prosecutor put it: 
Secret locations had to be found to interview individuals. 
International officials, whether white or black people, coming 
into certain areas were immediately identified as outsiders. 
This had major consequences for the quality of the evidence 
because those who were willing to be interviewed were not 
necessarily the best witnesses. Even those who might be willing 
to speak at first later change their mind when they realize who 
has been charged. People who are outside this institution 
looking at this say, “Ok, let’s charge Gaddafi, it’s easy, it’s 
obvious.” But who is going to be willing to come and testify 
against Gaddafi if their car could blow up while coming?85 
                                                                                                     
with the Florida State University Libraries), https://fsu.digital.flvc.org/ 
islandora/object/fsu:183025/datastream/PDF (describing the government’s 
placing of booby traps and mines around mass graves so as to prevent 
excavations).  
 83. See, e.g., SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 25–26 
(2010–11), https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-
memoranda/227-Second-Annual-Report-2010-2011 
There has been intimidation of witnesses in a number of ways: 
commencing in the last quarter of 2010, several calls have been made 
for a boycott of the Tribunal; public threats have been made to dissuade 
cooperation with the Tribunal; and unlawful broadcasts of audio 
recordings of witness interviews made in confidence to the UN 
International Independent Investigation Commission have been aired 
on some Lebanese television channels. 
 84. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS (JUNE 2003–JUNE 2006), 
at 7 (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-
47A9-9821-725747 378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf. 
 85. John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Fragmentation and 
Harmonization in the Development of Evidentiary Practices in International 
Criminal Tribunals, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 
50, at 159, 171 (citation omitted). 
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Prosecutors in other international tribunals have faced similar 
challenges.86 Constrained investigations frequently generate 
sub-par evidence that subsequently creates fact-finding 
uncertainty during trials. Evidence and witnesses who should 
appear often do not, and those who do may not be the most 
probative. Such difficulties were on full display in the ICC’s first 
case—Prosecutor v. Lubanga87—which featured a Congolese 
defendant accused of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers.88 
Prosecutors determined that prospective Congolese witnesses 
would be endangered if even interviewed by ICC employees,89 so 
they instead enlisted local persons—denominated 
intermediaries—to act as liaisons between potential witnesses and 
the ICC.90 It was intermediaries, then, who selected and 
interviewed the individuals who later appeared as witnesses at 
trial.91 Although the prosecution’s use of intermediaries may have 
been well-intentioned, it backfired spectacularly. Nine witnesses 
who claimed to have been child soldiers testified, yet the Trial 
Chamber did not credit or rely on a single one of them.92 The very 
first prosecution witness recanted his testimony, claiming that an 
intermediary had instructed him to provide a false account,93 and 
several subsequent witnesses made similar allegations.94 In the 
end, the Trial Chamber rejected virtually all of the evidence 
provided by intermediaries and harshly criticized the prosecution 
for their use.95 Although the Trial Chamber’s criticism may have 
                                                                                                     
 86. See MAHONY, supra note 79, at 72–75 (discussing challenges facing ICTR 
prosecutors). 
 87. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 269–283. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See O’Donnell, supra note 79, at 11–13. 
 90. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 34–35. 
 91. See id. at 35. 
 92. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 479 (recognizing “the trauma 
the children called by the prosecution are likely to have suffered” but finding them 
“unreliable as regard the matters that are relevant to the charges in this case”). 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 330, 430, 449. 
 94. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 44. 
 95. See id. at 32 (“The judgment is scathing about the investigative failures 
of the Prosecutor and particularly the excessive reliance on these 
intermediaries.”); Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 482 (“The Chamber is of 
the view that the prosecution should not have delegated its investigative 
responsibilities to the intermediaries . . . .”). 
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been justified, one cannot deny that it was the unstable security 
situation in the Eastern DRC that prompted the prosecution’s 
employment of intermediaries in the first place.96 
Because on-going conflicts render investigations so difficult to 
conduct, mass atrocity investigations are commonly delayed until 
the conflict ends and the region stabilizes.97 Such delays reduce the 
kinds of evidentiary difficulties just described, but they give rise to 
other evidentiary difficulties. For instance, time lags give 
perpetrators an opportunity to destroy evidence or conceal it,98 and 
many perpetrators have made use of this opportunity over the 
years. The Japanese destroyed documents in anticipation of the 
Tokyo Tribunal trial,99 the Khmer Rouge destroyed documents as 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3394-Red, Defence 
Observations following the Décision relative aux requêtes présentées par la 
Défense dans ses observations 3379 et 3386 des 3 et 17 juin 2013, ¶ 15 (Aug. 5, 
2013) https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf (noting 
that even in 2013, “current, extreme security difficulties pertaining in Ituri and 
North Kivu render[] investigations either extremely difficult or impossible to 
conduct”). 
 97. See Mike P.J. Cole, Investigating Military Operations: Added Value or 
Added Hype?, 212 MIL. L. REV. 194, 207 (2012) (noting, among other things, that 
“witnesses become more willing to speak when it is clear that the previous 
government will not return”). To be sure, evidence gathering can be fraught with 
difficulty even when the conflict has unquestionably ended and the ruling party 
unquestionably supports prosecutions. Rwanda was in this comparatively 
favorable position following the 1994 genocide; nonetheless, many potential 
Rwandan witnesses were afraid to speak with investigators, and virtually all who 
testified at the ICTR did so using pseudonyms. See Sluiter, supra note 48, at 967, 
976 (explaining the need for witness protection). The fears of ICTR witnesses were 
well-founded. See Second Annual Report of the ICTR, ¶ 51, U.N. Docs. A/52/582 
and S/1997/868 (Dec. 2, 1997) (reporting on the murders of scores of ICTR 
witnesses); PAUL MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS 
COURTS AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 74 (2000) (same). 
 98. Whiting, supra note 27, at 336. 
 99. The Japanese War Ministry ordered the burning of all inculpatory 
documents in the possession of its troops. See Yuma Totani, The Case Against the 
Accused, in BEYOND VICTOR’S JUSTICE? THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL REVISITED 
147, 154–55 (Yuki Tanaka et al. eds., 2011); see also ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE 
OTHER NUREMBERG 40 (1987) (noting that Japanese militarists destroyed 
inculpatory documents “by the warehouseful”); PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE 
JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951, at 
10 (1980) (“Rapid demobilization and repatriation of ex-POWs, witnesses and 
evidence scattered literally throughout the world, wholesale destruction of key 
documents by Japanese, incredible difficulties in identifying, locating and 
apprehending suspects in Japan proper and East Asia and other factors combined 
to render nearly impossible the tasks given to Allied prosecutors.”). 
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Cambodia was being overrun by Vietnamese troops,100 and the 
Serbs, though not able entirely to destroy evidence of the 
Srebrenica massacres, did conceal a great deal of it by burying the 
victims in secret mass graves and repeatedly moving the remains 
from one grave to another.101 Evidence also disappears for innocent 
reasons as time passes. In the ordinary course of time, witnesses 
die, documents are lost, and various forms of forensic evidence can 
lose their probative value.102 
Delaying prosecutions can also undermine the quality of the 
evidence that is discovered. For one thing, research shows what we 
all know, that memories fade over time,103 so testimony about 
long-ago events is less likely to be accurate than testimony about 
recent events. The international tribunals have repeatedly 
recognized this fact and found deficiencies and inconsistencies in 
witness testimony attributable to the lengthy delay between the 
events in question and testimony about those events.104 The 
                                                                                                     
 100. See CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM THE 
CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE 64–65 (2005). 
 101. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 382–
383 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070310174358/http://www.un.org/icty/blagojevic/t
rialc/judgement/index.htm (“The Trial Chamber is also of the opinion that the 
opening of the mass graves and the reburial of the victims in other locations was 
an attempt to conceal the evidence of the mass killings.”); see also Zekerija 
Mujkanović, The Orientation Criteria Document in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES 
79, 80 (Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (reporting that “complete archive 
materials were secretly carried out of” Bosnia). 
 102. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 64–65 (describing the destruction of 
forensic evidence in Cambodia); Whiting, supra note 27, at 332 (explaining causes 
of “degradation of evidence”); Witteveen, supra note 7, at 388 (“The time lapse 
between the moment of the occurrence of the facts and crimes, and the actual 
investigations and trials has consequences. . . . [E]vidence will have been lost.”). 
 103. See JOHN W. SHEPHERD ET AL., IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 80–86 (1982) (describing authors’ study showing that 
memory remained relatively constant for a few months after an event but declined 
sharply after eleven months); Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory, 
in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 12, 23–25 (Gary L. 
Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984) (summarizing research). But see 
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-T-84-ENG, Transcript, at 23 
(Apr. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016] (providing 
expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille’s description of the hypermnesia of some 
trauma victims who repeatedly relive their traumatic experiences and thereby 
retain strong memories of them). 
 104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment 
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probative value of forensic evidence can also decline over time.105 
A mass grave that is examined a decade after the atrocity, for 
instance, typically will reveal less probative evidence than a mass 
grave that is examined three months after the atrocity.106 As this 
                                                                                                     
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 49 (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02993.PDF [hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment] 
(providing examples of witness recollection issues due to delay between the event 
being testified about and the trial); Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶ 103 
(same); Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 65 (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Muhimana Judgment] (same); 
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-01-64-T, Judgement, ¶ 83 (June 17, 
2004) [hereinafter Gacumbitsi Judgment] (same); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. 
IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 
2005) (“The Chamber further observes that the seven years that have passed 
since the events in the Indictment have, in all likelihood, affected the accuracy 
and reliability of the memories of witnesses, understandably so.”); Prosecutor v. 
Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring and Partially 
Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 
18 of the Statute, ¶ 44 (Aug. 2, 2007) (“The Chamber duly advised itself that 
evidence about facts which took place 10 or more years prior to testifying may 
well involve inherent uncertainties due to the imperfections and vagaries of 
human perception and recollection.”). 
 105. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 6 (stating that experts 
“stressed that arriving as early as possible at crime scenes and collecting evidence 
promptly can help ensure that evidence is not tampered with, degraded, or 
destroyed”); O’Donnell, supra note 79, at 16–17 (describing the way in which 
investigative delays impeded investigators’ ability to obtain probative forensic 
evidence in the Lubanga case). Different types of forensic evidence will degrade 
over differing timelines. For example, DNA evidence will become severely 
damaged, as a result of exposure to environmental effects such as temperature 
extremes, humidity, or microbial activity, over the course of thirty or forty years. 
See Lisa Lane Schade & Leonard Klevan, Identifying Degraded DNA, FORENSIC 
MAG. (Jan. 2, 2007, 3:00 AM), https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2007/ 
01/identifying-degraded-dna (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). At the other end of the spectrum, fresh 
fingerprints might last only eight hours before deteriorating. JOSEPH J. VINCE & 
WILLIAM E. SHERLOCK, EVIDENCE COLLECTION 45 (2005). 
 106. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 65–66 (describing the way in which 
“[m]ass graves are particularly vulnerable to destruction both by humans and the 
environment”); see also Shaoni Bhattacharya, Vital Evidence Lost from Iraq’s 
Mass Graves, NEW SCIENTIST (May 14, 2003), https://www.newscientist.com/ 
article/dn3733-vital-evidence-lost-from-iraqs-mass-graves/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2018) (“‘Once bodies have been buried, there is a certain amount of decomposition 
but then the environment stabilises . . . . But when people have been digging and 
exposing the grave to the air, ‘you get a resumption of decay.’”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Iraq: Protect Mass Graves, HUM. RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jan. 30, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/30/iraq-
protect-mass-graves (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Exhumations without forensic 
experts can destroy critical evidence . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
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discussion shows, then, the context of conflict and instability that 
surrounds mass atrocities creates unique and often severe 
fact-finding challenges for those later seeking to prosecute or 
defend their alleged perpetrators. 
b. Governmental Interference in Prosecutions 
Because most mass atrocities are embedded in large-scale 
conflicts involving governmental officials, the prosecutions of mass 
atrocities frequently give rise to governmental interference. In 
some cases, governmental authorities flat-out prevent 
investigations: Burundi, for instance, has denied the ICC access to 
its territory since the ICC’s Prosecutor opened a preliminary 
investigation in April 2016.107 President al Bashir of Sudan 
likewise prevented the ICC from conducting in-state investigations 
in Darfur,108 and his obstructionism eventually led ICC 
prosecutors to suspend investigations entirely.109 Other 
governments interfere to support prosecutions and convictions. 
The Government of Rwanda, for instance, allegedly prevented 
ICTR defense counsel from entering Rwanda;110 similarly, in 2012, 
                                                                                                     
Law Review); Morgan, supra note 82, at 67–68 (explaining probative value of 
forensic evidence in mass atrocities). 
 107. Jane E. Stromseth, Assessing the International Criminal Court, at 12 
(unpublished draft) (on file with author); see also Burundi Warns Against 
Execution Investigations at ICC, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/burundi-warns-against-execution-investigations-
icc-105538473.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018) (warning victims of extrajudicial 
executions not to provide evidence to the ICC) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 108. See Göran Sluiter, Responding to Cooperation Problems at the STL, in 
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 134, 148–49 (Amal Alumuddin et al. eds., 
2014) (explaining that investigations in Darfur are “practically impossible” 
because Sudan’s government refuses to cooperate). Sudan, indeed, has made 
cooperating with the ICC a criminal offense. See Prosecutor v. Banda, ICC-02/05-
03/09-274, Defense Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 2 (Jan. 6, 
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_00037.PDF. 
 109. See David Smith, ICC Chief Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes 
Probe, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
(discussing circumstances prompting suspension of the ICC’s investigation in 
Darfur) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. See generally Thierry Cruvellier, Grass-Roots Justice¸ INT’L JUST. TRIB., 
Mar. 29, 1999. See also Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgement 
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when ICC defense counsel to Libyan defendant Saif al-Islam 
travelled to Zintan, Libya to interview her client, she was arrested 
by Libyan authorities and detained for several weeks.111 
Even when government officials do not close the borders to 
investigators or physically bar their access to witnesses, they can 
prevent probative evidence from reaching the courtroom. ICC 
investigators, for instance, were able to acquire sufficient evidence 
to convince the court’s Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm charges 
against Kenyan President Kenyatta112 and Vice President Ruto,113 
but thereafter the defendants or their associates allegedly 
intimidated prospective witnesses to such a degree that a large 
proportion of them recanted their inculpatory statements.114 As a 
                                                                                                     
and Sentence, ¶¶ 41–43 (Dec. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-
98-41-T, Decision on Motion Concerning Alleged Witness Intimidation, ¶ 1 (Dec. 
28, 2004) (alleging intimidation prevented defence counsel from fact finding); Kai 
Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial,” “Inquisitorial” or 
Mixed?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 36 (2003) (“There are various cases where defence 
counsel were denied permission to enter the territory of . . . Rwanda.”); Frederik 
Harhoff, The Role of the Parties Before International Criminal Courts in Light of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 645, 655–56 (Horst 
Fischer et al. eds., 2001) (“Defence Counsels were flatly denied permission to 
enter into Rwanda . . . .”); Steven Kay & Bert Swart, The Role of the Defence, in 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1421, 1424 (Antonio 
Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (observing that Rwanda obstructs defense counsel’s 
access to the State). 
 111. See Marlise Simons, Libya Refuses to Release Hague Court Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/africa/libya-
refuses-to-release-hague-staff-in-custody.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
(discussing the arrest of Melinda Taylor and other ICC attorneys) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Libya ICC Lawyer Melinda Taylor and 
Colleagues Fly Out, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-18683786 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 112. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 
¶ 428 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF. 
 113. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 
¶ 302 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01004.PDF. 
 114. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Red, Public redacted 
version of “Prosecution’s request for the admission of prior recorded testimony of 
[REDACTED] witnesses,” 29 April 2015, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Conf + Annexes, 
¶ 2 (May 21, 2015); Press Release, Kenya Human Rights Comm’n, Kenya: 
Termination of Ruto and Sang case at the ICC: Witness Tampering Means 
Impunity Prevails over Justice Again (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-
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consequence of these witness defections, an ICC Trial Chamber 
acquitted Ruto,115 and the prosecution withdrew its case against 
Kenyatta for lack of evidence.116 These examples and many others 
show that governmental authorities have the power to 
dramatically impact the quantity and quality of evidence available 
in a mass atrocity prosecution, and they commonly make use of 
that power. 
2. Fact-Finding Challenges Caused by Group Criminality 
The previous section highlighted the conditions of conflict that 
surround most mass atrocities, and it considered the evidentiary 
implications of those conditions. Another important contextual 
factor, one that this section will take up, relates to the perpetrators 
of mass atrocities. Specifically, mass atrocities are typically 
perpetrated by massive numbers of individuals, but in most cases, 
only a small proportion of those individuals can be prosecuted. 
That fact alone does not create evidentiary difficulties; indeed, few 
fact-finding challenges would arise if prosecutors targeted their 
limited number of prosecutions against those for whom there was 
the greatest evidence of criminality. But usually—and 
understandably—they do not. Rather, prosecutors typically target 
the high-level government and military officials who orchestrated 
the atrocities, and they leave unprosecuted the individuals who 
                                                                                                     
03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/528-kenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the 
icc-witness-tampering-means-impunity-prevkenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sang-
case-at-the-icc-witnesstampering-means-impunity-prevails-over-justice-again.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (“[T]he Prosecutor sought to admit the 
testimonies . . . [because] a number of witnesses, after giving their initial 
testimony, stopped cooperating due to threats . . . .”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Tom Maliti, Prosecutor Withdraws Seven Witnesses in 
Kenyatta Case in Past Year, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/01/prosecutor-withdraws-seven-witnesses-in-
kenyatta- case-in-past-year/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining circumstances 
surrounding witnesses’ removal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 115. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public Redacted 
Version of: Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 464 
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF. 
 116. See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-983, Notice of withdrawal 
of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF. 
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actually carried out the offenses.117 This sort of targeting makes 
good sense both from a political standpoint as well as a penological 
standpoint,118 but it also creates a great deal of uncertainty at trial. 
Domestic prosecutors have long found it difficult to obtain 
good quality evidence against leaders of large criminal networks, 
such as organized crime syndicates or drug cartels,119 and that 
same difficulty arises and creates tremendous uncertainty in trials 
of mass atrocity leaders. Some of the uncertainty stems from the 
fact that the evidence available to prove the criminal liability of 
high-level offenders is generally weaker and less certain than the 
evidence available to prove the criminal liability of direct 
perpetrators.120 Consider, for instance, forensic evidence. Even in 
developing nations, where less non-testimonial evidence exists, 
those prosecuting isolated, domestic murders frequently rely on 
forensic evidence to identify perpetrators and prove their criminal 
liability.121 Section 1 just revealed that such forensic evidence 
                                                                                                     
 117. See generally MARIA NYSTEDT ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON ASSISTING 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 43 (2011); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, 
Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal 
Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 627 (2007). ICTY prosecutors initially 
targeted lower-level offenders in an effort to build cases against more senior 
officials, but tribunal judges successfully opposed that strategy. See Claudia 
Angermaier, Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria in the Work of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in CRITERIA FOR 
PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES 27, 29–31 
(Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (observing that prosecutors prioritize 
indictment of high-level officials over those actually carrying out the crimes). 
118. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 149 (2005) (discussing benefits of 
the “command responsibility doctrine”). 
 119. See generally Lauren Ouziel, Ambition and Fruition in Federal Criminal 
Law: A Case Study, 103 VA. L. REV. 1077 (2017); Spencer Martinez, Note, 
Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Exchange for 
Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 142 (1999). 
 120. Whiting, supra note 27, at 339. 
 121. See, e.g., Uganda v. Engonu, HCCC No. 29 of 2012 (Uganda) (June 8, 
2015), http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/hc-criminal-division/2015/18/; Uganda v. 
Mukalu, HCCC No. 86 of 2013 (Uganda) (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/high-court-criminal-division/2015/2; Uganda v. 
Okello et al. (Criminal Session Case No. 100 of 2012.) [2015] UGHCCRD 5 
(Uganda) (May 26, 2015), http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/hc-criminal-
division/2015/5; Nyander v. RL, [2011] LRSC 9 (Liberia) (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2011/9.html?stem=0& 
synonyms=0&query=murder; Fartoma v. RL, [2011] LRSC 7 (Liberia) (Jan. 20, 
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might not be available in mass atrocity prosecutions if 
prosecutions are delayed for years or decades. But even when 
forensic evidence of a mass atrocity does exist, it frequently has 
little probative value. 
It has little probative value because it does not answer the 
questions that most mass atrocity prosecutions seek to answer. 
That is, forensic evidence of an isolated murder can help to identify 
the person who killed the victim. Forensic evidence of a mass 
killing might do the same, but because the direct perpetrators of 
mass atrocities are rarely prosecuted, the forensic evidence is 
usually far less important.122 To be sure, a mass grave will show 
                                                                                                     
2011), http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-in/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2011/7.html?stem=0& 
synonyms=0&query=murder; Williams v. RL, [2014] LRSC 45 (Liberia) (Aug. 15, 
2014), http://www.liberlii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl/lr/cases/LRSC/2014/ 45.html?stem=0 
&synonyms=0&query=murder; Republic v. Mngulwi, [2003] TZHC 7 (Tanzania) 
(May 2, 2003), http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=tz/cases/TZHC/ 
2003/7.html&query=murder; Republic v. Maneno, [2005] TZHC 60 (Tanzania) 
(Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=tz/cases/ 
TZHC/2005/60.html&query=murder; Republic v. Muasya, (2009) (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ view/97451/; Republic v. Kokane, 
(2009) (H.C.K.) (Kenya),  http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/104682/. 
 122. Because the Special Panels were able to apprehend only low-level 
Timorese soldiers who actually perpetrated the crimes, they did make use of some 
forensic evidence. See MOHAMED C. OTHMAN, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND EAST TIMOR 106–07 
(2005) (explaining that forensic evidence is useful for identifying victims); 
Prosecution v. Tacaqui, Case No. 202001, Judgement, at 6 (Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes, Dist. Court of Dili, Timor-Leste Dec. 9, 2004), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/un_etta/eng/decisions/2004.12.09_Prosecutor_v_Tac
aqui.pdf (using forensic evidence to give “comprehensive picture of the case” at 
trial rather than proving the accused’s wrongdoing); Prosecution v. Correia, Case 
No. 272003, Judgement, at 7 (Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Dist. Court of 
Dili, Timor-Leste Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.worldcourts.com/un_etta/ 
eng/decisions/2005.04.25_Prosecutor_v_Alves_Correia.pdf; Prosecution v. 
Mesquita, Case No. 282003, Judgement, ¶ 43 (Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 
Dist. Court of Dili, Timor-Leste June 12, 2004), http://www.worldcourts. 
com/un_etta/eng/decisions/2004.12.06_Prosecutor_v_Mesquita.pdf. The ICTR, for 
its part, abandoned its forensic program after only one mass excavation; although 
the excavation exhumed the remains of nearly 500 individuals, only a handful of 
these individuals could be identified. See Eric Stover & Rachel Shigekane, 
Exhumation of Mass Graves: Balancing Legal and Humanitarian Needs, in MY 
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS 
ATROCITY 85, 89 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004); see also Caroline 
Buisman, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to Investigate Incriminating and 
Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
205, 211 (2014) [hereinafter Buisman, Prosecutor’s Obligation] (observing that in 
Katanga “no proper exhumation was conducted to identify the number and causes 
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that a large-scale killing took place, but that sort of fact is rarely 
contested in mass atrocity trials.123 Forensic analysis can also show 
that large numbers of victims were summarily executed,124 which 
can suggest that the crimes were committed as part of a systematic 
or coordinated attack.125 Certainly, these facts can suggest the 
involvement of a military commander or a civilian leader. 
However, because mass atrocity trials typically feature defendants 
who have no physical link to the crime,126 forensic evidence will 
usually be far less probative in such trials than in trials of isolated 
criminality.127 
Eyewitness testimony is also likely to be more problematic in 
prosecutions of mass atrocities in general and prosecutions of 
high-level offenders in particular. For one thing, whereas isolated 
crimes are often perpetrated by individuals who are known to 
victims,128 mass atrocities are more frequently perpetrated by 
                                                                                                     
of deaths and the status (civilian or military) of the victims”). 
 123. See, e.g., Duch Judgment, supra note 49, ¶ 208 (noting that defendant 
admitted that at least 12,273 people died or were executed at Tuol Sleng while he 
commanded the prison camp); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-02-78-
T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 561 (Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga 
Judgment] (“It is not disputed that the Nyange Parish Church was destroyed on 
16 April 1994 or that the Tutsi civilians who had taken refuge there were killed.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, 
¶¶ 5217–5218 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf [hereinafter 
Karadžić Judgment] (describing the cause of death for 150 individuals). 
 125. See, e.g., Krstić Judgment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 71–79 (finding that the 
forensic evidence corroborated witness’s testimony of mass killings). 
 126. See Morten Bergsmo & William H. Wiley, Human Rights Professionals 
and the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Core International Crimes, in 
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIELD OFFICERS 11 (2008), http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/ 
nordem/publications/manual (“[I]nternational criminal jurisdictions . . . can be 
expected to primarily pursue alleged perpetrators who were not physically 
present when criminal conduct was committed.”). 
 127. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 338 (“With respect to linkage, the accused 
commander is often far removed from the crimes and there are generally no 
documents directly connecting him to the commission of those crimes.”). 
 128. In both developed and developing nations, violent crime is commonly 
perpetrated by the victims’ friends and family members. A Bureau of Justice 
Statistics study showed, for instance, that in 2010 in the United States, about 
38% of non-fatal violent crimes were committed by strangers, compared to about 
62% committed by non-strangers. See ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION COMMITTED BY 
STRANGERS, 1993–2010, at 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
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those who have no pre-existing relationships with their victims. 
Thus, to the extent that the identity of perpetrators is relevant in 
a mass-atrocity case, then fact-finders must rely on the most 
questionable evidence of all—stranger eyewitness 
identifications.129 In addition, when high-level offenders are 
prosecuted, then the most probative witnesses are usually 
insiders; that is, those who worked with the defendants to commit 
the atrocities. Unlike unfamiliar victim witnesses, insider 
witnesses have no difficulty identifying the defendant, but they 
often do have incentives to falsely inculpate or exculpate him. To 
be sure, the perjuring proclivities of insider witnesses also create 
evidentiary challenges in trials of domestic crimes,130 so trials of 
                                                                                                     
pdf/vvcs9310.pdf (providing statistics concerning relationship between homicide 
victims and their killers). The study further found that between 1993 and 2008, 
between 21% and 27% of homicides were committed by strangers, versus 73% to 
79% by non-strangers. Id. The relative proportions can vary considerably 
depending on the gender of the victim. In particular, women are far more likely 
to be victimized by someone they know than are men. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF 
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 2015 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WEEK 
RESOURCE GUIDE 10 (2015), https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/ncvrw2015/pdf/FullGuide.pdf   
In cases in 2012 where victims indicated their relationship to the 
offender, males experienced aggravated assault by a nonstranger 
(including intimate partner, other relative, and friend/acquaintance) 
in 34.8 percent of cases and by a stranger in 53.0 percent. Females 
experienced aggravated assault by a nonstranger in 52.4 percent of 
cases and by a stranger in 37.9 percent of cases. 
For similar statistics regarding Liberian crime, see SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ISSUE 
BRIEF, READING BETWEEN THE LINES: CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION IN LIBERIA 2, 10 
(2011), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/Liberia-
AVA-IB2.pdf. 
 129. See Gaetano Noël Best, Fair and Accurate Fact-Finding in Dutch 
Atrocity Crimes Cases (Oct. 20, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Amsterdam) (discussing the inherent unreliability of eyewitness evidence and 
describing it as “regularly inaccurate, even if it has been gathered under the most 
favourable of circumstances”) (on file with author). 
 130. See, e.g., Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope”: Giglio, Accomplice 
Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1140 
(2004) (“Not only do accomplice witnesses have a motive to fabricate, they have 
an ability to fabricate and to fabricate convincingly.”); Martinez, supra note 119, 
at 151 (“Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the witness’ strong motive to lie” 
when cooperation agreement reduces jail time); C. Blaine Elliott, Life’s 
Uncertainties: How To Deal With Cooperating Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 
16 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 7 (2003) (“The testimony of informants who have received deals 
from prosecutorial agencies is suspicious from the outset.”); Emily Jane Dodds, 
Note, I’ll Make You a Deal: How Repeat Informants are Corrupting the Criminal 
Justice System and What to Do About It, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1063, 1075 (2008) 
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mass atrocities are not uniquely plagued by that phenomenon. 
Perjuring insiders are, however, likely to have a more pronounced 
and distortive effect on fact-finding in mass atrocity prosecutions 
because, as noted above, such prosecutions are far less likely to 
receive other probative evidence that might reveal or cast doubt on 
the perjured testimony. International criminal transcripts are 
filled with the testimony of insider witnesses who fell out with 
their former partners-in-crime and later detested them;131 insiders 
who sought to shift blame to defendants in order to minimize their 
own criminal responsibility;132 and insiders who sought to 
exculpate defendants with whom they shared continuing bonds of 
loyalty.133 Not surprisingly, the international tribunals have 
                                                                                                     
(describing an Innocence Project report that found that an insider witness 
testified against the defendant in more than 15% of wrongful convictions 
subsequently overturned by DNA evidence). 
 131. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, 
at 30 (Mar. 11, 2005) (stating that insider witness had reason to dislike defendant 
because defendant had fired the witness). 
 132. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶ 578 & n.1607 
(“Given that Witness CDL is still serving time in Rwanda for crimes related to 
the events of 1994, he could have personal motivations to implicate the Accused 
while minimising his own role in the attacks.”); Prosecutor v. Ndahimana, Case 
No. ICTR-01-68-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 244 (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-01-68/trial-
judgements/en/111230.pdf [hereinafter Ndahimana Judgment] (“As shown by the 
evidence in this case, the witness may have tried to minimise his own role in 
events.”); Prosecutor v. Setako, Case No. ICTR-04-81-T, Judgement and Sentence, 
¶ 156 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/ case-
documents/ictr-04-81/trial-judgements/en/100225.pdf [hereinafter Setako 
Judgment] (“The potential, therefore, exists that the witness’s testimony may be 
influenced by a desire to positively impact his circumstances in Rwanda or to shift 
blame to Setako either to minimize his own involvement or based on the belief 
that Setako was behind his increased sentence.”); Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case 
No. ICTR-97-36A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 119 (July 5, 2010), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c722d350.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Judgment] 
(“[A]t earlier stages of the proceedings in Rwanda, the witness may have 
attempted to minimise his involvement in the genocide.”); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, 
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 156 (Sept. 12, 2006), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/ICTR/MUVUNYI_ICTR-00-
55/MUVUNYI_ICTR-2000-55A-T.pdf (“[Witness] had reason to enhance 
Muvunyi’s participation in the genocidal campaign and in that way attempt to 
diminish his own role therein.”); see also id. ¶¶ 131, 309, 371, 420, 421 (describing 
witness’s involvement with crimes). 
 133. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, ¶ 566 
(Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/ SCSL-04-
15-T-1234-searchable.pdf [hereinafter RUF Judgment] (rejecting one witness’s 
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recognized the increased uncertainty inherent in insider witness 
testimony and have typically treated it “with caution.”134  
                                                                                                     
testimony because the “witness did not testify in order to assist the 
Chamber . . . but to assist the Accused”). 
 134. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring 
and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed 
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute, ¶ 47 (Aug. 2, 2007); see also Prosecutor v. 
Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 166, 240, 312, 
321, 410, 487, 557, 569, 594, 652, 734 (July 14, 2009), 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-31/trial-
judgements/en/090714.pdf [hereinafter Renzaho Judgment] (carefully 
scrutinizing insider witnesses’ testimony); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. 
ICTR-01-64-T, Judgement, ¶ 86 (June 17, 2004) (same); Prosecutor v. Gatete, 
Case No. ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 405 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d9c16642.pdf [hereinafter Gatete Judgment] 
(assessing witness’s for bias because his testimony “may have been influenced by 
a desire to positively impact his circumstances in Rwanda”); Prosecutor v. 
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 278, 449, 
547, 552 (Dec. 6, 2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/ unictr.org/files/case-
documents/ictr-00-55b/trial-judgements/en/101206.pdf [hereinafter 
Hategekimana Judgment] (considering credibility of the witnesses with caution); 
Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶¶ 181, 198, 306, 440–441, 452–453, 
487, 576, 591 (treating insider witness testimony with caution); Karera 
Judgment, supra note 65, ¶¶ 52, 165, 189, 215 (“[Witness] testimonies may have 
been influenced by a wish to positively affect proceedings against them in 
Rwanda.”); Munyakazi Judgement, supra note 132, ¶¶ 10, 119, 199, 206, 255, 366, 
417; Ndahimana Judgement, supra note 132, ¶¶ 48–49, 248–249, 443, 454, 459–
461, 631, 687 (finding that “accomplice witness testimony” should be treated with 
caution); Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. ICTR-99-54-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶¶ 66, 193, 201, 283, 311, 479 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://wwww.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-54/trial-
judgements/en/121220.pdf [hereinafter Ngirabatware Judgment] (using caution 
when evaluating accomplice testimony); Prosecution v. Nizeyimana, Case No. 
ICTR-2000-55C-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 113, 504, 560, 608, 621, 811, 820, 
836–838, 1107–1108 (June 19, 2012), 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-00-55c/trial-
judgements/en/120619.pdf [hereinafter Nizeyimana Judgment] (“Witness ZBH’s 
incarceration at the time of his testimony necessitate[s] that his evidence be 
viewed with the appropriate caution.”); Prosecutor v. Ntawukulilyayo, Case No. 
ICTR-05-82-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 199, 219, 233, 266, 434 (Aug. 3, 
2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-05-
82/trial-judgements/en/100803.pdf [hereinafter Ntawukulilyayo Judgment]; 
Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Judgement and Sentence, 
¶¶ 226, 1064, 1142, 1210, 1276, 1348, 1447, 1480 (May 31, 2012), 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-98-44d/trial-
judgements/en/120531.pdf [hereinafter Nzabonimana Judgment] (“[T]he 
Chamber does not doubt that detained accomplice witnesses may be motivated to 
testify falsely for a number of reasons.”); Setako Judgment, supra note 132, ¶¶ 50, 
72, 167, 200, 203, 250, 264, 339, 348, 367, 424 (“The Chamber has determined 
elsewhere that there is a need to view his evidence with caution . . . .”). See 
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Finally, because most defendants in mass atrocity trials are 
not direct perpetrators, prosecutors frequently must employ 
complex theories of liability to link the defendant to the crimes on 
the ground. In some cases, prosecutors seek to hold high-ranking 
defendants liable for the acts of their subordinates, but to do so, 
they must establish a chain of command from the perpetrator to 
the defendant along with the defendant’s authority over the direct 
perpetrators.135 Although evidence of these elements might be 
relatively easy to establish in cases where well-defined military 
forces unquestionably carried out the crimes, armed conflicts in 
many states feature combatants who hail both from regular 
military forces and irregular paramilitary groups, so it is often 
unclear which set of combatants is responsible for a given 
massacre136 and, correspondingly, which commander bears 
responsibility for the acts. Even when it is easy to identify the 
group that perpetrated the atrocities, it may be difficult to know 
whether the defendant exercised authority over that group. In 
such cases, de jure authority may not reflect actual authority,137 
and de facto authority may be the subject of unclear, conflicting 
evidence.138 
                                                                                                     
generally RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
§ 6.23 (2002). 
 135. It is well-established in the case law that, to convict a defendant on a 
theory of command responsibility, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
and the direct perpetrators stood in a superior-subordinate relationship. See 
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 346, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (providing the 
essential elements of command responsibility); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. 
SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 781 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter AFRC Judgment]. 
 136. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 150–
54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf (finding that an 
array of different violent groups could be performing killings). 
 137. See Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 193 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf (“The power or 
authority to prevent or punish does not solely arise from de jure authority 
conferred through official appointment.”). 
 138. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 118, at 130 (“In many conflict 
situations, there may be no clear evidence of a de jure hierarchy and it may be 
difficult to prove the scope of a defendant’s effective de facto authority.”); see also 
AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 539–544, 551, 564, 569, 581–584, 616, 626. 
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3. The Coalescence of Location and Large-Scale Criminality 
Sections 1 and 2 show that large-scale criminality creates its 
own unique fact-finding challenges that are independent of the 
challenges that stem from the location of the crime. In other words, 
large-scale crimes give rise to certain fact-finding challenges 
regardless of whether the crimes are perpetrated in developed or 
developing nations. That said, this section will show that many of 
the fact-finding challenges that arise during the prosecution of 
large-scale crimes are exacerbated when those crimes take place 
in developing nations. Similarly, this section will show that many 
of the fact-finding challenges that arise when a crime occurs in a 
developing nation are exacerbated when the crime is part of a mass 
atrocity. A few examples will show how the size of the crime 
interacts with the location of the crime to produce additional 
fact-finding obstacles. 
First, consider the command responsibility doctrine just 
discussed in section 2. To hold a defendant liable on a command 
responsibility theory, prosecutors must prove that the defendant 
was in a superior/subordinate relationship with the direct 
perpetrators of the crime.139 As section 2 indicated, that element 
can be difficult to prove no matter where the crime is located. 
Indeed, the ICTY acquitted a number of Yugoslav defendants of 
command responsibility charges because prosecutors could not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had 
authority over the direct perpetrators.140 However, as difficult as 
it is to obtain convincing evidence of command responsibility in 
                                                                                                     
139. Infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgement, 
¶¶ 605, 612, 1101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/tjug/en/had-judg060315e.pdf 
(rejecting prosecution’s allegations because defendants did not have “effective 
control” of the brigade); Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 
¶ 841 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf (acquitting 
defendant because “he possessed neither the authority to prevent the crimes that 
were committed, nor to punish the perpetrators”); Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case 
No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement, ¶ 752 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/tjug/en/ tcj051116e.pdf 
(“[Defendant’s] influence falls short of the standard required to establish effective 
control.”). 
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developed nations, it is usually harder in developing nations. For 
instance, after civilians were attacked in South Sudan, the 
spokesman for the South Sudanese Army highlighted the difficulty 
of knowing which group was responsible. As he observed: 
“Everyone is armed, and everyone has access to uniforms and we 
have people from other organized forces.”141 In addition, chains of 
authority are often more fluid and transitory during conflicts in 
developing nations. Shifting, temporary allegiances were notorious 
features of the conflict in the DRC,142 for example, and in various 
SCSL trials, judges heard wildly conflicting testimony regarding 
the structure, hierarchy, and leadership of the various fighting 
forces in Sierra Leone.143 Indeed, in the RUF case, the SCSL 
struggled to make sense of complexly organized rebel groups that 
displayed multiple functional layers that were not strictly 
hierarchically structured.144 The SCSL faced similar challenges in 
the AFRC case, where the Trial Chamber candidly acknowledged 
“that the AFRC was not a traditional military organization”145 and 
that the defendant “had less control over his troops than a 
commander would have over highly disciplined troops in a regular 
                                                                                                     
141. Jason Patinkin, Rampaging South Sudan Troops Raped Foreigners, 
Killed Local, AP (Aug. 16, 2016), https://apnews.com/237fa4c447d74698804 
be210512c3ed1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 142. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE EASTERN CONGO: A CFR 
INFOGUIDE PRESENTATION, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/eastern-congo#!/ (“[A] 
multitude of ethnically based local militias have added to the chaos with their 
opaque networks of shifting alliances.”); S. AFR. INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, GUERRILLAS IN THEIR MIDST: SHIFTING ALLIANCES IN THE 
DRC 1 (July 13, 1999) (discussing alliance shifts in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo); see also Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, Judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 601 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF (explaining that Ngiti combatants were 
part of different alliances). 
143. See AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 539–544, 551, 564, 569, 581–
584, 616, 626 (describing hierarchy of the organization); RUF Judgment, supra 
note 133, at nn.1205, 1213–19, 1222–24 (citing testimony in closed session). 
 144. See Harmen van der Wilt, Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some 
Reflections on the Elements of Effective Command and Control, in THE SIERRA 
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144, 151 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed., 2014) (“[T]he 
SCSL had to grapple with a complex organization, displaying several functional 
layers that were not strictly hierarchically structured.”). 
 145. AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶ 1738. 
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army.”146 Finally, the chains of authority that do exist in 
developing nations are less likely to be committed to writing. As 
noted, SCSL trials featured considerable, if conflicting, testimony 
about chains of authority,147 but little documentary evidence 
corroborating that testimony. 
Second, the problematic features of the evidence available in 
developing nations are apt to be magnified when the crime under 
prosecution is a mass atrocity. For instance, Part I noted that 
eyewitness testimony is frequently unreliable, so the 
predominance of eyewitness testimony in trials in developing 
nations renders their judgments less certain than judgments that 
are based on both testimonial and non-testimonial evidence. But 
the quality of the eyewitness testimony—or stated differently, the 
likelihood that it is inaccurate—varies with the trial, and I 
maintain that trials of mass atrocity are more likely to feature 
unreliable or inaccurate witness testimony than trials of isolated 
crimes. For one thing, whereas isolated crimes are prosecuted soon 
after they occur, mass atrocities frequently are not prosecuted for 
years and sometimes decades after their occurrence.148 Because 
memories of events fade over time, for that reason alone we can 
expect a greater proportion of witnesses in mass atrocity 
                                                                                                     
 146. Id. ¶ 1740. 
 147. See id. ¶¶ 553, 561, 564, 576 (finding discrepancy between testimonies 
about who was in command). See generally Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T, Transcript, at 5 (Jan. 21, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 77 (Jan. 27, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case 
No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 112 (May 4, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, 
Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 29 (May 22, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. 
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 20 (May 23, 2007) (same); 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 71–72, 101–102 (Oct. 
22, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 44 
(Nov. 23, 2007) (same); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, 
at 3–6; 30–33 (June 9, 2008) (same).  
 148. Witnesses testifying in the most recent ICTY and ICTR cases described 
events that had occurred nearly twenty years before their testimony. See 
Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgement, ¶ 145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf (noting 
that witnesses testified about events in 1992 and acknowledging the risks of time 
passing). And ECCC witnesses described events that took place in the 1970s; that 
is, approximately 40 years before their testimony. See Duch Judgment, supra note 
49, ¶ 11 (noting, in 2009, that the charges against the defendant stemmed from 
actions taken between 1975 and 1979). 
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prosecutions to testify inaccurately than witnesses in prosecutions 
of isolated crimes. We also might expect a greater proportion of 
witnesses in mass atrocity prosecutions to testify inaccurately 
because the events they witnessed were so devastating. Research 
shows that those who witness violent events are more likely to 
misperceive than those who witness nonviolent events149 because 
an individual’s ability to perceive declines when he or she is 
experiencing stress.150 Similarly, studies indicate that traumatic 
memories are stored differently than non-traumatic memories and 
are usually recalled in a more fragmented, non-chronological 
way.151 Although all crime victims are apt to be traumatized by 
their criminal experience, on average victims of mass atrocity may 
well suffer greater trauma as a result of the arguably greater 
suffering they endured. Many Tutsi victims of the Rwandan 
genocide spent days and weeks literally hiding for their lives, while 
all of their Tutsi family, friends, and neighbors were massacred 
around them.152 Similarly, many Muslim women from Srebrenica 
                                                                                                     
 149. See ELIZABETH LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 25 (2007) (finding that the “accuracy of person descriptions was poorer 
in the violent condition” compared with nonviolent conditions in the experience). 
 150. See, e.g., John C. Brigham et al., The Effect of Arousal on Facial 
Recognition, 4 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 291 (1983) (“Considering the 
generally stressful experience of crimes, eyewitnesses can be expected to provide 
relatively unreliable evidence.”); Sven-Ake Christianson & Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
Memory for Traumatic Events, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 225, 227 (1987) 
(“[T]he more peripheral details of an emotional event are remembered less well 
than the peripheral details of a non-emotional event.”); Brian R. Clifford & Clive 
R. Hollin, Effects of the Type of Incident and the Number of Perpetrators on 
Eyewitness Memory, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 364, 369 (1981) (“[T]he direct effect 
of witnessed violence was the impairment of eyewitness memory . . . .”); Saul M. 
Kassin, Eyewitness Identification: Victims Versus Bystanders, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1984) (finding that bystanders provide more accurate 
testimony of a crime than victims); Douglas P. Peters, Eyewitness Memory and 
Arousal in a Natural Setting, in 1 PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY: CURRENT 
RESEARCH AND ISSUES: MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, 94 (Michael M. Gruneberg 
et al. eds., 1988) (finding that eyewitness testimony is less accurate when witness 
is subjected to high stimulus environment). 
 151. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 23 (testimony 
of expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille); Hugues F. Herve, Barry S. Cooper & 
John C. Yuille, Biophysical Perspectives on Memory Variability in Eyewitnesses, 
in APPLIED ISSUES IN INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, EYEWITNESS MEMORY, AND 
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 99, 104 (Barry S. Cooper et al. eds., 2013). 
 152. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement 
and Sentence, ¶¶ 153–155 (Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. 
ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement, ¶ 350 (Jan. 22, 2004); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case 
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lost all of their male relatives—their husbands, sons, brothers, 
fathers and nephews—while some of the few men who survived did 
so by lying amongst piles of corpses until they were able to 
escape.153 Thus, as awful as it is to witness or be the victim of an 
isolated violent crime, in terms of trauma, it likely pales in 
comparison to being a witness or victim of a mass atrocity.154 
The long duration of many mass atrocities also negatively 
impacts victims’ ability to accurately recall their details. Many 
witnesses in the ICC’s Lubanga case were girls who had been 
abducted and had endured repeated rapes and other forms of 
sexual assault over long periods of time.155 Similarly, the “bush 
wives” in Sierra Leone, who testified before the SCSL, were 
subjected to collective rape and various forms of sexual slavery for 
months and years at a time.156 Research shows that individuals 
such as these—who are victims of repeated, similar crimes—blend 
their memories of the individual traumatic events that they 
suffered into a generalized recollection called a “script memory.”157 
                                                                                                     
No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 806–813 (Jan. 27, 2000) 
[hereinafter Musema Judgment].  
 153. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 5663 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016) (“Some witnesses 
described hiding underneath the bodies of their fellow detainees and escaping the 
killing sites under perilous circumstances.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-
98-33-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 69, 207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 
2, 2001) (“At several of the sites, a few wounded people survived by pretending to 
be dead and then crawled away.”).  
 154. See Witteveen, supra note 7, at 385 (describing the gruesome nature of 
mass atrocities and the trauma experienced by witnesses). 
 155. See Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 890–895 (describing sexual 
violence experienced by women at “demobilisation centres”); see also U.N. ORG. 
STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEM. REP. CONGO (MONUSCO), INVISIBLE 
SURVIVORS: GIRLS IN ARMED GROUPS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FROM 
2009 TO 2015 (2015), https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/151123-Girls-in-Armed-Groups-2009-2015-Final.pdf 
(stating abducted Congolese girls spent an average of six months with their 
abductors and as long as four years). 
 156. AFRC Judgment, supra note 1365, ¶¶ 701, 709–713; see also U.N. SEC. 
COUNCIL, SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE 6–9 (1999), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6af804.html. See generally CHRIS COULTER, 
BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN’S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN 
SIERRA LEONE 126–50 (2009) (discussing “[w]ar [r]apes and [g]endered [vi]olence” 
experienced by women). 
 157. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 35–36 
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Such victims typically are able to recall the script with reasonable 
accuracy, but are unable to recall the isolated events that gave rise 
to the script.158 Accurately recalling the script may be sufficient for 
some mass atrocity prosecutions, but not for those that require 
witnesses to testify about specific events. 
Finally, the characteristics of witnesses from developing 
nations also combine with the characteristics of mass atrocities to 
produce unique fact-finding challenges. Take, for example, the fact 
that mass atrocity witnesses from developing nations often are 
unable to date the events they witnessed. That inability—and the 
resulting fact-finding uncertainty at trial—stems neither from the 
location of the crimes alone nor the size and scope of the crimes 
alone, but rather from a combination of the two. We know that it 
is not the developing status of the location of the crime alone that 
drives witnesses’ dating difficulties because witnesses from those 
same locations regularly establish the dates of the isolated crimes 
that they witness.159 Moreover, even if a given witness cannot 
accurately date an isolated crime, his or her failure to do so usually 
does not impair accurate fact-finding because the date will have 
been recorded when the crime was initially reported.160 Because 
most mass atrocities, by contrast, feature large numbers of similar 
crimes that take place over the course of months or years, they 
prove far more difficult to date. Indeed, most mass atrocities do not 
                                                                                                     
(containing the testimony of expert witness Dr. John Charles Yuille); Herve et al., 
supra note 151, at 107. 
 158. See Ntaganda Transcript, Apr. 18, 2016, supra note 103, at 35–36; Herve 
et al., supra note 151, at 107. 
 159. Isolated crimes are usually reported immediately after they occur, so a 
witness who may have no clue as to the date of a mass atrocity will often be able 
to date an isolated crime. See, e.g., Davis v. Republic, (127 of 2005) TZCA 2 (June 
27, 2005) (Tanzania) (providing dates for isolated crime); Nyander v. RL, LRSC 9 
(21 Jan. 2011) (Liberia) (same); Fallah v. RL, LRSC 16 (9 Aug. 2007) (Liberia) 
(same); Nimungu v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 06 of 2012) UGCA 25 (6 June 
2016) (Uganda) (same). 
 160. See, e.g., Uganda v. Ssemanda, (HCT-06-CR-SC-0059 of 2013) 
UGHCCRD 44 (28 Apr. 2016) (Uganda) (stating the alleged rape occurred on 
September 30, 2012 and was immediately reported to the police, and the date of 
the offense was corroborated by the medical report admitted into evidence 
documenting the victim’s medical exam that immediately followed the offense); 
People v. Twambo, (2016) J1, J9 [HC] (Zam.) (stating the offense occurred on May 
24, 2013, was reported to the police the following day, and the date of the offense 
was corroborated by the medical report admitted into evidence documenting 
medical attention provided immediately following the offense). 
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even become the subject of an official investigation until years after 
they occurred, so frequently, the only way to determine when they 
did occur is to rely on the testimony of witnesses, witnesses whose 
memories have faded by that time.161 At the same time, it is also 
not the size of the crime alone that leads to dating difficulties, but 
also its location. Although any witness is apt to have difficulty 
recalling the precise date of a crime that occurred long ago and in 
the context of numerous similar crimes that were perpetrated over 
the course of months or years, witnesses from a developing nation, 
who may not be able to read a calendar or who have little need for 
Western-style precision regarding dates,162 will have considerably 
more difficulty. As discussed below, many Sierra Leonean 
witnesses could not even pinpoint the year or month of the crime 
they were describing163 whereas that level of imprecision is rare 
among Western witnesses. 
Although the coalescence of the nature of the crime and the 
location of the crime explains much of the fact-finding uncertainty 
we have observed over the years, it does not reduce its impact. If a 
Trial Chamber cannot ascertain when the relevant crimes took 
place, then the defendant cannot prove that he was in another 
location at the time of the crimes. More generally, Trial Chambers 
that cannot determine simple facts surrounding the crimes find 
themselves confronting many other uncertainties. In numerous 
ICTR cases, for instance, witnesses who testified about meetings, 
speeches, or other events were found not to corroborate one 
another because their accounts were so undetailed that the Trial 
Chambers could not determine whether the witnesses were even 
describing the same event.164 
                                                                                                     
161. Supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text. 
 162. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 85 (advising those interviewing 
witnesses that “[i]n some areas of the world people will not relate to the 
international calendar [so interviewers should] try asking them to relate [the 
event in question] to a particular season, holiday, or feast day or agricultural 
event (e.g., a harvest)”); id. at 48 (stating that time markers such as important 
holidays or agricultural events “are often used by local inhabitants when 
explaining when significant events occurred”); see also FACT-FINDING WITHOUT 
FACTS, supra note 7, at 82 (observing that witnesses may have different 
understandings of distance and time). 
 163. Infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Ndahimana Judgment, supra note 132, ¶¶ 539–541 (finding 
inconsistencies in the testimony of different witnesses); Gatete Judgment, supra 
note 134, ¶¶ 199, 223 (same); Ntawukulilyayo Judgment, supra note 134, ¶¶ 231, 
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4. Variations in Size, Scope, and Political Context 
Thus far, this section has explored the fact-finding difficulties 
that arise when large-scale criminality is prosecuted. Throughout 
the section, I have compared prosecutions of mass atrocities with 
prosecutions of isolated crimes in order to show the way in which 
prosecutions that involve large-scale criminality give rise to 
unique, often severe, fact-finding challenges. Up until now, and for 
the sake of comparison, I have largely treated mass atrocities as a 
uniform phenomenon and compared them to isolated domestic 
crimes, which I have also treated somewhat monochromatically. 
But, of course, much variation exists in both sets of crimes; mass 
atrocities in particular come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and 
political contexts. This subsection, then, explores some of those 
variations and considers their evidentiary implications. In 
particular, whereas this section as a whole has shown that mass 
atrocity prosecutions are more likely to feature factual uncertainty 
than isolated crime prosecutions, this subsection asks whether we 
can draw distinctions among mass atrocities of different sizes and 
scopes. Put another way, it asks whether there is reason to believe 
that prosecutions of more-massive mass atrocities feature greater 
fact-finding obstacles than prosecutions of less-massive mass 
atrocities. 
Before delving into this question, we must first recognize that 
the size and scope of a given mass atrocity can differ dramatically 
from the size and scope of the particular crimes that prosecutors 
might choose to charge. We have already observed that prosecutors 
of mass atrocities charge only a small subset of mass atrocity 
offenders.165 In addition, prosecutors of mass atrocities—and 
particularly prosecutors targeting high-level offenders—routinely 
charge only a subset of the crimes they believe that a given 
defendant committed because prosecuting the defendant for all of 
his indictable offenses would cost too much and take too long.166 
                                                                                                     
389 (same). 
 165. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 43. 
 166. Indeed, commentators have criticized international prosecutors for 
issuing broad indictments or seeking the joinder of indictments to create one 
overly broad trial. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Slow Poison: Joinder and the Death of 
Milošević, in THE MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY 106, 113–18 (Timothy William 
Waters ed., 2013); Gwynn MacCarrick, Lessons from the Milosevic Trial, ON LINE 
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This selective charging has obvious fact-finding implications: all 
things being equal, the more events, crime sites, and charges that 
prosecutors include in an indictment, the greater the likelihood 
that the fact-finder will reach mistaken conclusions about some of 
those events, crime sites, and charges. Stated differently, all things 
being equal, narrowly-tailored indictments will give rise to less 
fact-finding uncertainty than broader, more expansive 
indictments. 
Because that observation is somewhat self-evident, we can put 
prosecutorial charging discretion to one side and consider the more 
interesting question of the way in which the size and scope of the 
atrocity itself might impact accurate fact-finding. However, even 
this question requires some preliminary analysis because the size 
and scope of an atrocity can be measured in a host of different 
ways. We might measure the size and scope of an atrocity by its 
number of victims, for instance, or by its duration, or its 
                                                                                                     
OPINION (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp? article=4394 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Cf. Öberg, supra note 50, at 115 (observing that “[m]ost international 
criminal indictments are very broad in their scope”). Partly in response, ICC 
prosecutors brought a very narrow indictment against the Court’s first defendant, 
Thomas Lubanga, and charged him only with the enlistment and conscription of 
child soldiers, when he could have been charged with many other crimes. See 
Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers, 10 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 945, 946 (2012). Similarly, Iraqi High Tribunal prosecutors initially 
prosecuted Saddam Hussein only for the massacres in Dujail, when Hussein was 
believed to have killed hundreds of thousands as part of other crimes. See Alleged 
Crimes of Saddam Hussein, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2005), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/19/iraq (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
(listing alleged crimes of Saddam Hussein’s from 1970’s to 2003) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Indictments deemed too narrowly tailored are 
also subject to criticism. See Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, ¶¶ 4–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004) (criticizing the prosecution for issuing 
indictments that “arbitrarily present facts, selected from the context of a larger 
criminal plan and, for unknown reasons, limited to one day and to the village of 
Glogova only”); Mariana Goetz, Reparative Justice at the International Criminal 
Court: Best Practice or Tokenism, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY: THE HEALING ROLE OF REPARATION 53, 59 (Jo-Anne M. Wemmers ed., 
2014) (reporting on victims’ shock and dismay upon learning that the ICC’s 
charges against Lubanga would be limited to his involvement in the enlistment 
and conscription of child soldiers); Paul Seils, The Selection and Prioritization of 
Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in 
CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES 
69, 74 (Morton Bergsmo ed., 2d ed. 2010) (same). 
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geographical scope. Or we might assess the size and scope of an 
atrocity by the level of harm inflicted; on that measure, we might 
distinguish between an atrocity featuring mass killings and an 
atrocity featuring mass detentions, and rank the former as more 
massive by virtue of its enhanced gravity. 
Differences in the measures just described will certainly have 
some fact-finding impact, but not an impact that is easy to 
ascertain or that systematically points to greater or lesser factual 
uncertainty at trial. For instance, atrocities that feature more 
victims will likely feature more individuals who can later testify 
about the crimes (if the victims survive to tell the tale), or more 
forensic evidence (if the victims do not). Differences in the severity 
of the harms encompassed in an atrocity will likely have a similar 
impact. Large-scale killings might give rise to fewer victim 
witnesses and more forensic evidence, whereas large-scale 
detentions might give rise to more victim witnesses and less 
forensic evidence. These distinctions, however, are not likely to 
have a dramatic impact on fact-finding accuracy. Victim witnesses 
are not generally hard to come by,167 and, as mentioned above, 
forensic evidence often has little relevance if the defendant is a 
high-level offender who never set foot at the crime scene.168 
Indeed, international criminal lawyers frequently distinguish 
between crime-base evidence and linkage evidence.169 As those 
names suggest, crime-base evidence informs fact-finders about the 
actual crimes that took place; for example, the killings, rapes, or 
property destruction that occurred during an attack.170 Linkage 
                                                                                                     
 167. Indeed, because testifying can endanger witnesses, some prosecutors 
seek to use as few as possible. See MAHONY, supra note 79, at 31 (“The prosecution 
hopes to require only a small number of witnesses, usually between 20 or 30, for 
each case.”).  
 168. See supra notes 118–126 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Whiting, supra note 27, at 338 (stating that the prosecutor’s “focus 
will generally be less on the crimes themselves than on the linkage between the 
crimes and the Accused”); Bergsmo & Wiley, supra note 126, at 8–11 (describing 
the two components of the initial phases of inquiries and investigations of an 
international criminal investigation as the work to establish the crime in the case 
and the process to develop the link between the suspect and the perpetrator of 
the crime); Jackson, supra note 7, at 30–31 (detailing how in some tribunals, 
different evidentiary rules govern the introduction of the two different kinds of 
evidence). 
 170. See BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 49, at 7–8 (defining the 
crime base as “the event and actors present at or near the scene of the crime”). 
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evidence serves to link the defendant to those crimes.171 The 
distinctions in size, scope, and severity just described are most 
likely to influence the quantity and quality of crime-base evidence 
available at a given trial, not the linkage evidence.172 Thus, a crime 
that features more victims will provide prosecutors with more 
potential crime-base witnesses to describe the atrocity, but unless 
this is a rare instance in which the defendant is accused of 
personally perpetrating the crime, the increased number of 
crime-base witnesses will only make it easier to prove the (often 
uncontested) fact that the crime took place; it will not enhance the 
prosecutor’s ability to link (physically distant) defendants to the 
crime. Moreover, because crime-base evidence tends to be far more 
plentiful than linkage evidence, increases or decreases in the 
former generally have little evidentiary impact. 
The duration of the atrocities is also unlikely to have 
considerable evidentiary impact, and their geographical scope may 
have no evidentiary impact at all. For one thing, any difficulties 
occasioned by an atrocity’s sprawling geographical or temporal 
scope are apt to be ameliorated through the prosecution’s charging 
decisions.173 That is, prosecutors frequently focus their indictments 
on atrocities occurring during a particular time frame or in a 
particular region in order to make their trials more manageable. 
Even if they do not, however, little likely turns on it. To be sure, it 
is more costly and time-consuming to investigate crimes that span 
a broad geographical area than it is to investigate more 
geographically circumscribed crimes.174 But there is little reason 
to believe that investigations of geographically sprawling atrocities 
give rise to less credible or less plentiful evidence than 
investigations of less geographically sprawling crimes. By 
                                                                                                     
 171. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 117, at 43 (explaining how “investigators 
and analysts must . . . work together to uncover information which can be used 
as evidence linking those allegedly most responsible for the commission of the 
crimes to the crime scene”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Seils, supra note 166, at 71 (discussing the ICC’s case selection 
criteria as including “the scale of the crime in question, including the number of 
victims and possible considerations of temporal and geographic intensity”). 
 174. See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for 
Post-Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives, at 8, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/4 (2006) 
(“Trials for system crimes tend to be large and costly, as demonstrated by the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunals.”). 
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contrast, atrocities that occur over long periods of time may give 
rise to less accurate testimony in part because it is harder to 
accurately date a particular event when that event is one of a 
series of similar events that occurred over a long period of time.175 
My previous research bears out this common-sense conclusion. 
Although many witnesses at all three of the tribunals that I 
studied176 had difficulty providing exact dates for the events they 
witnessed,177 SCSL witnesses—who were victims of a decade-long 
war—frequently could not even get close.178 Indeed, SCSL 
witnesses who could recall the month a crime occurred were 
comparatively precise,179 given that many SCSL witnesses could 
testify only that the crime occurred during the dry season or the 
                                                                                                     
 175. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 24–25. 
 176. The tribunals under study were the ICTR, SCSL, and Special Panels. See 
generally id.  
 177. Id. at 24–27. 
 178. Id. at 25.  
179. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, 
at 61 (Apr. 6, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 
Transcript, at 86 (Apr. 11, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-
16-T, Transcript, at 96 (June 27, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript, June 27, 
2005]; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 100 
(June, 20, 2005) (recalling that an event occurred in May 1997); Prosecutor v. 
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 8 (July, 1, 2005) (recollecting 
that an event occurred in March of 1998); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. 
SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 44 (July 7, 2005) [hereinafter Brima Transcript, 
July 7, 2005] (demonstrating the witness’s inability to recall the date he was 
captured); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 56, 
74–75 (July 11, 2005) (discussing the witness’s inability to recount dates attacks 
occurred); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 25 
(July 12, 2005) (showing discrepancies in witness’s dating of events); Prosecutor 
v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 26, 49 (July 13, 2005) (“I 
could not remember day, but it was in August.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 80–81 (Oct. 4, 2004) (demonstrating the witness’s 
ability to the recount the month an event occurred); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 182 (Oct. 8, 2004) (“It was June I said.”); Prosecutor 
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 50, 57, 78 (Oct. 14, 2004) (“I can 
recollect the month, but not the date.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-
15-T, Transcript, at 31, 92 (Oct. 18, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-
04-15-T, Transcript, at 96 (Oct. 25, 2004) (“I can’t remember the date now, but it 
did happen.”); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 13–14 
(Oct. 27, 2004) (showing that a witness could date an event as within a couple of 
months).  
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rainy season180 or during a particular year.181 Some witnesses, 
indeed, could not even identify the year in which the crime 
occurred.182 Indeed, in the SCSL’s CDF case, date questions proved 
so difficult for witnesses that when one defense counsel, Dr. Jabbi, 
asked a witness, “on what day did the Kamajors enter Kenema?” 
the presiding judge remarked sarcastically, “Dr. Jabbi, I wish you 
luck.”183 
For this reason, atrocities of longer duration are probably 
subject to more fact-finding uncertainty than atrocities of a shorter 
duration, but the differences may not have significant practical 
import because many international criminal witnesses have 
difficulty accurately dating events regardless of the atrocity’s 
duration. To be sure, witnesses are more likely to dramatically 
misdate events when they occur in the context of longer-running 
                                                                                                     
 180. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 2–
3, 11 (July 21, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 
8, 21–22 (Oct. 21, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, 
at 94–97 (Jan. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, 
at 79 (Mar. 17, 2006); Fofana Transcript, June 21, 2004, supra note 64, at 54–55; 
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 6966 (Apr. 8, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7017, 7052 (Apr. 9, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript, at 7388 (Apr. 14, 
2008); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 160 
(Sept. 14, 2004); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, 
at 17, 24–25, 53 (Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript, Nov. 8, 2004]; 
Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 4 (Nov. 12, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 45 (Nov. 
16, 2004); Brima Transcript, Apr. 8, 2005, supra note 64, at 47; Prosecutor v. 
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 82–83, 97–99 (June 30, 2005); 
Brima Transcript, July 7, 2005, supra note 179, at 102, 112–13 (July 7, 2005); 
Brima Transcript, July 14, 2005], supra note 64, at 41–42, 49; Prosecutor v. Brima 
et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 68 (Sept. 15, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 62 (Sept. 19, 2005). 
 181. See Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 
20 (Nov. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana Transcript, Nov. 11, 2004] (questioning a 
witness who could not recall the precise date or month an event occurred); see also 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 3–4 (Oct. 11, 2004) 
(“I can’t be too exact on the time frame.”). 
 182. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, 
at 30 (July 25, 2005) (conveying Witness TF1-157’s inability to recall even the 
year in which rebels attacked Bonoya); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-
04-16-T, Transcript, at 73–74 (Apr. 7, 2005) (demonstrating Witness TF1-085’s 
inability to state what year she was captured); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case 
No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 37 (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Fofana 
Transcript, Sept. 21, 2004]. 
 183. Fofana Transcript, Sept. 21, 2004, supra note 182, at 37. 
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atrocities than shorter-running atrocities,184 but the misdating 
need not be dramatic to cause problematic uncertainty during 
trial. For instance, the crimes comprising the Rwandan genocide 
occurred, in most regions, over a few short weeks, yet dating 
disparities and confusions were rife among ICTR witnesses.185 
These dating disparities spanned only days or weeks and not 
months or years, yet their impact on fact-finding was nonetheless 
significant. As noted above, Trial Chambers often refused to find 
one witness’s account of an event corroborative of another’s when 
the witnesses dated the event differently.186 Likewise, Trial 
Chambers often considered testimony that featured date 
inconsistencies to be unreliable.187 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the size and scope of a 
mass atrocity is not likely to predict the level of evidentiary 
                                                                                                     
 184. See supra notes 174–183 and accompanying text (detailing witness’s 
misdating of events that occurred during an atrocity that spanned ten years). 
 185. See, e.g., Nzabonimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 419 (observing that 
Witness CNR1’s dating of events was not consistent with Embassy telegrams); 
Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 175 (noting the Trial Chamber’s 
concern about “the inconsistency in the Prosecution and Defence evidence about 
the date on which Witness BUQ’s employers left their home in the Taba 
neighbourhood”); Setako Judgment, supra note 132, ¶ 438 (explaining that “the 
chronology provided by the witness for the events is not clear”); Ngirabatware 
Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 787 (describing discrepancies in the witness’s 
estimates of time). Frequently, witnesses dated events differently in their pretrial 
statements than they did in their testimony. See, e.g., Karera Judgment, supra 
note 65, ¶¶ 135, 164, 226, 229; Kanyarukiga Judgment, supra note 123, ¶¶ 605–
606 (“Witnesses CBK and CDL gave testimony at trial that was inconsistent with 
their prior statements.”); Prosecution v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 112 (May 23, 2005) (discussing “discrepancies between prior 
statements and testimony”); Hategekimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶¶ 131, 
479 (describing two instances in which witnesses dated events differently during 
pre-trial statements and trial testimony); Muhimana Judgment, supra note 104, 
¶¶ 45–47, 65; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶¶ 55–60 (May 15, 2003); Nizeyimana Judgment, supra note 134, ¶ 41, 
191; Prosecution v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 175–179, 
194, 196, 204, 208–210, 218, 224, 318–327, 333–336, 342–343, 348, 366 (May 26, 
2003); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶ 88 (May 16, 2003) (“The witness could not confirm the date on which 
he fled and became a refugee, although he provided this date in his statement 
dated 31 January 1996.”); Prosecution v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A, 
Judgement, ¶ 453 (Apr. 1, 2011). 
 186. Supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I, 
Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 239 (July 15, 2004). 
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obstacles that trial participants will later experience. However, as 
we saw earlier in this section, mass atrocities occur in certain 
predictable contexts, and differences in these contextual features 
can give rise to dramatically different levels of factual uncertainty 
at trial.188 In this regard, two components appear particularly 
influential: (1) the length of time that elapses between the crime 
and the prosecution; and (2) the level of governmental interference 
in the trial. 
Turning first to the time lapse, subpart A showed that 
prosecutions of atrocity crimes frequently must be delayed to allow 
on-going conflicts to conclude and regions to stabilize. Subpart A 
likewise observed that, although delaying prosecutions may be a 
practical necessity in some circumstances, such delays inevitably 
give rise to certain evidentiary costs, such as evidence destruction 
and degradation. Here, I make the (hopefully uncontroversial) 
additional observation that the longer the delay, the greater the 
evidentiary costs that are likely to be incurred. That is, those 
prosecutions that are delayed for longer periods of time are likely 
to feature more fact-finding impediments than those that are 
delayed for shorter periods of time.189 Craig Etcheson, for instance, 
has compellingly described the way in which the forty-year delay 
in Khmer Rouge prosecutions negatively impacted evidence in 
Cambodia:  
Many a time we have observed cows and pigs consuming human 
bones that have been placed in open, unsecured genocide 
memorials. Even the earth itself passively consumes the 
evidence of genocide. The soils in much of Cambodia are highly 
acidic, and they rapidly dissolve the remains of victims in mass 
graves, including the bones of those interred in the graves. The 
simple environmental encroachment of rats, insects, mildew, 
seedlings, rust and rot in the extremely humid tropical 
environment takes a fearsome toll not only on paper records and 
human skeletal remains but also on more durable artifacts such 
as torture devices and shackles and even permanent structures 
like thatch, wooden, and even concrete or brick buildings. 
Finally, in Cambodia, there is annual flooding . . . and thus we 
                                                                                                     
 188. Supra Part III.A.4. 
 189. See ETCHESON, supra note 100, at 66 (“[I]t is essential to move early and 
move fast to gather the evidence of genocide and other crimes against humanity 
from the field. Humans, animals, and the environment itself, . . . inexorably 
consume the evidence of violations of international humanitarian law.”). 
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have seen numerous instances where mass graves have been 
washed away by the erosion of wandering rivers as they eat into 
riverbanks.190 
Finally, governmental interference in the prosecutions can 
have a profound impact on the quantity and quality of the evidence 
presented at trial. In most cases, governmental interference serves 
to obstruct prosecutions, as will be discussed again in Part IV. To 
that end, governments have destroyed incriminating evidence,191 
hidden incriminating evidence,192 and intimidated witnesses to 
prevent them from testifying.193 Less frequently, governments will 
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., supra notes 99–100 and accompany text.  
 192. See VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: 
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 82, 95, 106 (2008) 
(describing Croatia’s and Serbia’s withholding of evidence from prosecutors); ERIC 
STOVER ET AL., HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE PURSUIT OF WAR CRIMINALS FROM 
NUREMBERG TO THE WAR ON TERROR 57 (2015) (describing incidents in which 
American officials withheld evidence for political or military reasons); see also 
supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing Serbs’ attempts to conceal 
evidence of Srebrenica massacres). Finally, some governments do not bother 
hiding evidence; they simply refuse to provide it to when asked by the court. See, 
e.g., LIONEL NICHOLS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF 
IMPUNITY IN KENYA 165–66 (2015) (discussing the way in which Kenyan 
authorities withheld requested evidence); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-
14-A, Judgement, ¶ 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) 
(describing Croatia’s failure to open its archives during the trial stage). 
 193. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CROATIA 1 (2006) (“[Croatia’s] intimidation 
of some witnesses in domestic war crimes trials remained a problem . . . .”); 
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Red, Public Redacted Version of 
“Prosecution’s request for the admission of prior recorded testimony of 
[REDACTED] witnesses,” 29 April 2015, ICC-01/09-01/11-1866-Conf + Annexes, 
¶ 51, (May 21, 2015) (discussing testimony that was subject to interference); Press 
Release, Kenya Human Rights Comm’n, Termination of Ruto and Sang Case at 
the ICC: Witness Tampering Means Impunity Prevails Over Justice Again (Apr. 
7, 2016), http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/528-kenya-
termination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the-icc-witness-tampering-means-impunity-
prevkenya-termination-of-ruto-and-sang-case-at-the-icc-witness-tampering-
means-impunity-prevails-over-justice-again.html (describing the systematic 
witness tampering and intimidation in Kenya cases); Tom Maliti, Prosecutor 
Withdraws Seven Witnesses in Kenyatta Case in Past Year, INT’L JUST. MONITOR 
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2014/01/prosecutor-withdraws-
seven-witnesses-in-kenyatta-case-in-past-year/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“The 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) prosecutor has withdrawn at least seven 
witnesses in the case against President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta over the past 
year because the witnesses fear testifying, they have recanted their earlier 
statements to investigators, or for other unspecified reasons.”) (on file with the 
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impede defense counsel in an effort to ensure convictions.194 
Regardless of whether the governmental interference serves to 
obstruct the prosecution or the defense, it unquestionably 
introduces significant factual uncertainty into the trial. Indeed, 
this section has concluded that a variety of factors that serve to 
differentiate one mass atrocity from another—including the 
number of victims of the atrocity, the kinds of crimes comprising 
the atrocity, and the duration and geographical scope of the 
atrocity—likely have either a limited or an uncertain impact on 
fact-finding. By contrast, governmental interference, we can say 
with confidence, undermines fact-finding certainty in almost every 
case. When governments interfere in prosecutions—whether to 
withhold evidence or intimidate witnesses—they necessarily 
distort the factual picture presented to fact-finders. Not all such 
distortions have a dispositive impact on the trials’ verdicts, but all 
do reduce the certainty of the Trial Chamber’s factual findings and 
the confidence we can place in the accuracy of those findings. 
B. The Legal Characterization of the Crime 
Subpart A of this Part has identified the large size and scope 
of mass atrocity crimes as an important factor explaining the 
fact-finding challenges that confront many mass atrocity 
prosecutions. In this subpart, we turn our attention from the 
factual contours of the crimes to consider their legal 
characterization. In particular, mass atrocities can be 
characterized as international crimes or domestic crimes. For 
example, a mass killing can be charged as domestic murder, or it 
can be charged as one of a number of international crimes: 
genocide, murder as a crime against humanity, or the war crime of 
willful killing.195 This subpart shows that that characterization 
decision can have important evidentiary implications. 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 171 
(observing that states that are unwilling to investigate crimes themselves “may 
have an interest in causing harm to witnesses”). 
 194. See Buisman, Prosecutor’s Obligation, supra note 122, at 208 (describing 
the Congolese government’s refusal to allow defense counsel access to witnesses); 
see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (“The Government of Rwanda, for 
instance, allegedly prevented ICTR defense counsel from entering Rwanda . . . .”). 
 195. See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, MODEL CODES FOR POST CONFLICT CRIMINAL 
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It is reasonable to assume that greater fact-finding 
uncertainty attends the prosecutions of international crimes than 
domestic crimes for the simple reason that international crimes 
have more elements than domestic crimes. Indeed, international 
crimes typically include the elements of domestic crimes but also 
feature additional attendant circumstances or mens rea elements. 
Consider, for instance, a mass killing. If that mass killing is 
charged as the domestic crime of murder, then prosecutors will 
likely need to prove only that the defendant intentionally killed the 
victim.196 By contrast, if that same mass killing were charged as 
the war crime of willful killing, then the prosecutor would not only 
need to prove that the defendant intentionally killed the victim, 
but that the victim was a “protected person” under the Geneva 
Conventions, that the killing took place in connection with an 
international armed conflict, and that the defendant was aware of 
the circumstances establishing the protected status of the victim 
and the existence of the armed conflict.197 Similarly, if the mass 
killing was charged as murder as a crime against humanity, then 
the prosecutor would have to show both that the defendant 
intentionally killed the victim and also that he did so in the context 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population 
of which he was aware.198 At a very minimum, then, proving 
international crimes requires prosecutors to prove more elements 
and thereby requires them to obtain and present more evidence. 
                                                                                                     
JUSTICE 195 (2007), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MC1/MC1-
Part2Section1.pdf (“Intentional killing can be prosecuted under the MCC as a war 
crime (willful killing), a crime against humanity (murder), and genocide 
(killing).”). 
 196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012) (defining the elements of murder in the first 
and second degree). 
 197. See, e.g., U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(a)(i), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (June 
30, 2000), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/724/ 
27/PDF/N0072427.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes] 
(listing the elements of the war crime of willful killing).  
 198. See ICTR Statute, supra note 44, art. 3 (listing elements of the crime 
against humanity); S.C. Res. 827, art. 5 (May 25, 1993), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] (same). At the ICC, prosecutors additionally must 
prove that the widespread or systematic attack occurred “pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” ICC 
Elements of Crimes, supra note 197, art. 7. 
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These additional evidentiary burdens necessarily translate 
into some additional fact-finding uncertainty, but how much 
depends to some degree on which international crime is under 
prosecution. In particular, the additional fact-finding uncertainty 
is apt to be modest when the international crime in question is a 
war crime or crime against humanity, but much more substantial 
when the international crime is genocide. The reason is this: the 
additional elements needed to prove crimes against humanity or 
war crimes generally pertain to the violent context in which the 
subject crimes were perpetrated, and rarely is there considerable 
factual uncertainty about the existence of that violent context. In 
war crimes prosecutions, for instance, there is seldom any serious 
question that an armed conflict took place.199 It can be harder to 
gather evidence of an attack on a civilian population, in order to 
prove crimes against humanity, but the difficulties usually stem 
primarily from time and resource constraints,200 rather than a lack 
of evidence.201 Prosecutors at the Special Panels in East Timor, for 
example, were forced to charge most of their early defendants with 
domestic crimes, because they did not have the money or time to 
gather the additional evidence needed to prove crimes against 
humanity.202 But the evidence of the contextual elements for 
crimes against humanity was available,203 and Special Panels’ 
                                                                                                     
 199. To be sure, determining whether the armed conflict should be 
categorized as international or non-international can be challenging, see, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 76–123 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), but the existence of some kind of 
armed conflict—which is the primary distinction between a domestic crime and a 
war crime—is typically supported by ample evidence, see DAVID CHUTER, WAR 
CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 78 (2003). 
 200. See Bergsmo & Wiley, supra note 126, at 6 (“The search for evidence 
[necessary to prove the widespread or systematic requirement of crimes against 
humanity] requires investigative resources that are very often unavailable.”). 
 201. See Öberg, supra note 50, at 115 (“International criminal trials are 
usually very complex and heavy on evidence.”). 
 202. See Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: 
Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 215 (2001) [hereinafter 
Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone]; Suzannah Linton, 
Correspondents’ Reports, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 471, 481 (2000) (charging domestic 
crimes as a “pragmatic” decision caused by the “inadequate resources and the 
immensity of the task of proving international crimes” and that because suspects 
could not be detained indefinitely pending investigation of international crimes, 
“[t]he only other acceptable option would have been to release the suspects”).  
 203. See Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone, supra note 202, at 
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prosecutors soon began charging defendants with international 
crimes.204 
The additional elements needed to prove a genocide, by 
contrast, relate not to the contextual violence that surrounds the 
subject crimes but rather to the offender’s specific intent and the 
victims’ membership in a protected group.205 In particular, 
genocide is defined as the commission of an enumerated crime 
against a racial, ethnic, religious, or national group, with the 
specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.206 Finding 
evidence of that specific intent can be extraordinarily 
challenging:207 ICTY prosecutors repeatedly failed to prove 
genocidal intent,208 and the ICC’s judiciary has also been sharply 
                                                                                                     
207–08 (describing evidence of “clear patterns of a widespread, systematic attack 
on the civilian population of East Timor coupled with official Indonesian 
government involvement, the key elements of crimes against humanity”). 
 204. See David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor 
Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, in ASIAPACIFIC ISSUES, NO. 61, at 3 
(2002). 
 205. Cf. AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND GENOCIDE 7 (2007), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e13974_1c0840ebd4fd4a0bae137d8c15580a60.pdf 
(“Neither war crimes nor crimes against humanity require the special intent that 
is necessary to prove the crime of genocide, thus these crimes are often easier 
than genocide to prove in court even though they may be just as grave as 
genocide.”). 
 206. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 197, art. 6 (defining the 
elements of genocide at the ICC); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 44, art. 2 
(defining the elements of genocide at the ICTR); ICTY Statute, supra note 198, 
art. 4 (defining the elements of genocide at the ICTY). 
 207. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997–98 
Preparatory Committee’s Work, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 397, 413 (1997) 
(stating that genocide’s “specific intent requirement makes its proof very 
difficult”); L. Tabassi & E. van der Borght, Chemical Warfare as Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity, 2 HAGUE JUST. J. 5, 7 (2007) (“Genocide has been 
described as ‘the crime of crimes’ and is considered to be the most difficult crime 
to prove due to the special intent that must be established in order to convict a 
perpetrator.”); Michael J. Kelly, The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide Against 
Saddam Hussein Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 983, 
984 (2005) (“[G]enocide has traditionally been the most difficult crime for 
prosecutors to prove.”). 
 208. See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 108 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999) (“All things considered, the 
Prosecutor has not established beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide was 
committed . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 989 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004) (finding there was 
insufficient evidence to find the specific intent required for genocide); Prosecutor 
282 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (2018) 
divided on the issue.209 Although it might be obvious that a 
defendant intended to kill large numbers of individuals, it is often 
much less obvious whom exactly he was targeting and, most 
importantly, why. 
In sum, characterizing a mass atrocity as an international 
crime unquestionably increases the amount of evidence submitted 
in a case210 and thereby increases—sometimes dramatically—the 
cost and length of a trial.211 Somewhat less dramatic is its effect on 
fact-finding. It is reasonable to assume that characterizing the 
offense as an international crime rather than a domestic crime 
introduces some additional uncertainty because the more elements 
that fact-finders must decide, the more likely that they will decide 
one of those elements erroneously. However, only when the crime 
in question can be charged as a genocide might we reasonably 
assume that the decision to characterize the crime as international 
                                                                                                     
v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgement, ¶ 869 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006) (“Considering the evidence as a whole, the 
Chamber can make no conclusive finding that any acts were committed with the 
intent [to commit genocide].”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 
Judgement, ¶ 560 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) 
(acquitting the defendant of genocide); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 
Judgement, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) 
(finding that the defendant’s genocidal intent had not been proven). 
 209. For instance, in the Al Bashir case, the Pre-Trial Chamber initially 
refused to issue a warrant of arrest against Al Bashir for genocide, determining 
that specific genocidal intent was not the only reasonable conclusion that could 
be drawn from the evidence the Prosecution submitted. See Prosecutor v. Al 
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 205–206 (Mar. 4, 
2009). Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber misapplied the relevant standard of proof. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, 
ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
“Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” ¶ 33 (Feb. 3, 2010). On remand, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir had 
acted with specific genocidal intent, so it added three charges of genocide to the 
initial arrest warrant. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-94, Second 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 5 (July 12, 
2010). 
 210. See Öberg, supra note 50, at 116 (describing international criminal 
indictments as holding “the potential for a flood of evidence”). 
 211. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal 
Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“One of the most persistent criticisms 
of international criminal tribunals has been that they cost too much and take too 
long.”). 
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rather than domestic will introduce considerable additional 
fact-finding uncertainty. 
IV. At Home or Abroad? The Fact-Finding Impact of the 
Prosecuting Body 
The two preceding Parts have established, respectively, that 
the location of the mass atrocities and their size, scope, and legal 
characterization are significant factors impacting the level of 
factual uncertainty present in a mass atrocity trial. This Part 
examines the evidentiary and fact-finding implications of the body 
prosecuting the mass atrocities. In general, mass atrocities are 
prosecuted in one of four different kinds of fora: a domestic court 
in the state where the crimes took place (territorial court);212 a 
domestic court in a non-territorial state, usually pursuant to 
universal jurisdiction (foreign court);213 a court that has both 
domestic and international components (hybrid court);214 and a 
fully international court.215 As scholars have noted, different court 
systems present different sets of advantages and disadvantages for 
the prosecution of international crimes. For the purposes of this 
paper, I focus solely on the differential fact-finding challenges that 
typically attend the prosecutions of mass atrocities in the different 
court systems. As the following discussion reveals, I conclude that 
domestic courts exercising territorial jurisdiction confront the 
fewest impediments to accurate fact-finding whereas wholly 
international courts confront the most. 
                                                                                                     
 212. A few examples of states that prosecuted their own international crimes 
include Argentina, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 
169–71, 173–78. 
 213. See Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The 
Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2011) (seeking to identify every universal jurisdiction 
complaint from 1961 to 2011). 
 214. Some examples of courts featuring both domestic and international 
components include the SCSL, the ECCC, and the Special Panels. For a 
book-length description of these tribunals, see generally INTERNATIONALIZED 
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA (Cesare 
P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004). 
 215. Examples of fully international courts include the ICTY, the ICTR, and 
the ICC.   
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Before comparing the various bodies’ fact-finding capabilities, 
we must first put to one side one factor that creates considerable 
fact-finding uncertainty regardless of the body that is prosecuting 
the offenses. That factor is governmental opposition to the 
prosecutions. Part III already identified governmental opposition 
to the prosecutions as a factor that is uniquely likely to create 
fact-finding uncertainty at trial because governments that oppose 
prosecutions typically obstruct investigations and/or prevent 
access to relevant evidence and witnesses.216 We need to put such 
opposition to one side, however, because its potential to impair 
fact-finding inaccuracy—while substantial—transcends the 
criminal justice system in which the crimes are prosecuted. That 
is, governmental opposition to prosecutions has impaired 
fact-finding accuracy in every possible court system. 
Governmental opposition distorted fact-finding in fully 
international courts, such as the ICTY217 and ICC,218 in hybrid 
courts, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC)219 and the Special Panels,220 and even in foreign 
courts prosecuting international crimes pursuant to universal 
jurisdiction.221 Governmental opposition to prosecutions rarely 
                                                                                                     
 216. Supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 217. See, e.g., PESKIN, supra note 192, at 46–53. 
 218. Kenya’s opposition to prosecutions substantially impeded the ICC’s 
ability to find accurate facts in the Kenyatta and Ruto cases. See, e.g., supra note 
126 and accompanying text (discussing intimidation of witnesses by the Kenyan 
government). Some reports indicate that Russia will seek to obstruct the ICC’s 
investigations into international crimes in Georgia. See Russia refuses to 
Cooperate with ICC Investigation into 2008 War Crimes, AGENDA.GE (Feb. 2, 
2016),  http://agenda.ge/news/51706/eng (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (describing 
Russia’s failure to cooperate in ICC investigations) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Moscow Hints that it will not Cooperate with ICC’s 
Investigation into 2008 Russo-Georgian War, UAWIRE (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://uawire.org/news/icc-will-not-yet-release-names-of-suspected-war-
criminals-in-2008-russo-georgian-war (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing 
Russia’s intent to not further cooperate in ICC investigations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 219. See Cambodia: Stop Blocking Justice for Khmer Rouge Crimes, HUM. 
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 22, 2015, 11:07 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2015/03/22/cambodia-stop-blocking-justice-khmer-rouge-crimes (last visited Jan. 
22, 2018) (describing Cambodian resistance to ECCC investigations) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 220. Cohen, supra note 204, at 10. 
 221. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 291 (2003) 
(discussing some of the pitfalls of universal jurisdiction as including States’ 
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arises in domestic courts that would prosecute atrocities occurring 
on their own territory for the simple reason that courts in states 
that oppose prosecutions are not able even to initiate 
prosecutions.222 But for our purposes, the relevant point is that 
when the government of the state where the crime took place 
opposes prosecutions, then probative evidence located in that state 
will be difficult to obtain no matter where those prosecutions are 
being held. 
When we put governmental opposition to prosecutions to one 
side, we find a number of factors that suggest that fully 
international courts, hybrid courts, and foreign courts all face 
graver impediments to accurate fact-finding than territorial 
domestic courts. First, whereas territorial court personnel usually 
can communicate directly with defendants and witnesses, 
international, hybrid, and foreign courts must employ language 
interpretation to do so.223 The need for language interpretation in 
court proceedings is well-established to cause considerable factual 
uncertainty in those proceedings,224 so I will not rehearse the 
                                                                                                     
reluctance to hand over evidence); Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: 
Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 927, 962 (2009); 
Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 959–60 (2001). 
Sometimes governmental opposition to universal jurisdiction prosecutions is so 
robust that it leads not only to the dismissal of a particular case but also to 
revisions in the law authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction. See Steven 
R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 
889 (2003) (describing Belgium’s willingness to gut its universal jurisdiction 
statute following United States’ opposition).  
 222. It is common for international judges to observe that international courts 
have more difficulty carrying out their prosecutions than domestic courts because 
international courts do not have police or other law enforcement mechanisms at 
their disposal in the way that domestic courts do. See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., 
ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 61 (2009–2010), https://www.stl-ts l.org/en/documents/president-
s-reports-and-memoranda/226-Annual-Report-2009-2010; Antonio Cassese, On the 
Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 13 (1998) (describing how 
the ICTY cannot fulfill its function without state cooperation). However, that 
claim is slightly misleading. Domestic courts that are better able to conduct mass 
atrocity prosecutions are domestic courts that are located in states that do not 
oppose such prosecutions. When governmental opposition does exist, it impairs 
fact-finding accuracy no matter which criminal justice system is conducting 
prosecutions. 
 223. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 66 (discussing the 
need for language translation in international tribunals). 
 224. See Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International Criminal 
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problems at length here. Suffice it to say that international court 
transcripts are replete with interpretation and translation 
mistakes that eventually came to light,225 so we can presume that 
many other, similar mistakes were made but never identified. 
Consequently, all things being equal, the factual findings 
generated by a trial featuring language interpretation are apt to 
be less accurate than the factual findings generated by a trial 
where no interpretation is needed. 
Familiarity and knowledge about the atrocities and their 
participants is another factor relevant to fact-finding accuracy at 
trial, and one that also suggests an advantage for territorial courts. 
It is safe to assume that the personnel of international, hybrid, and 
foreign courts are, in general, less familiar with the cultural 
practices of the defendants, witnesses, and victims of the mass 
atrocities they prosecute and also less knowledgeable about 
relevant political, social, and historical features of the atrocities.226 
                                                                                                     
Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2008) (“When courtroom interpreters translate a witness’s 
testimony, errors are not just possible, they are inherent to the process.”); Robert 
Cryer, Witness Evidence Before International Criminal Tribunals, 3 L. & PRAC. 
INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 411, 420–28 (2003) (articulating the problems associated 
with translating witnesses’ testimony); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 
7, at 66–79 (describing errors in language translation). For a discussion of 
uncertainties caused by language interpretation at the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, see JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 263 (1994); 
HILARY GASKIN, EYEWITNESSES AT NUREMBERG 47 (1990); BRACKMAN, supra note 
99, at 23, 299. For a discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation 
in East Timor, see FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 69–72. For a 
discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation at the ICC, see 
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 22, ¶¶ 113–114; Ngudjolo Judgment, supra note 
104, ¶ 62. For a discussion of uncertainties caused by language interpretation at 
the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and 
Sentence, ¶ 23 (Dec. 6, 1999); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T, 
Transcript, at 47 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1996); 
Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, Transcript, at 6797–98 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 1997). 
The need for language interpretation not only gives rise to inaccurate reporting 
but sometimes also sabotage. See NYSTEDT ET AL., supra note 129, at 85 (“Past 
experience in conflict issues shows that infiltration of mission is most frequently 
accomplished through the use of interpreters and other local staff.”). 
 225. See FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 68–73. 
 226. See, e.g., Del Ponte, supra note 52, at 552 (noting that “international 
judges are not from the region and generally have no knowledge of relevant 
factors such as geography, locations where the crime took place, distances, 
language, cultural sensitivities and relevant political or historical background.”). 
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Tim Kelsall’s book, Culture Under Cross-Examination, provides an 
in-depth account of the way in which Sierra Leonean culture 
created significant challenges for SCSL personnel who were 
unfamiliar with it.227 My own research, likewise, has documented 
numerous errors and misunderstandings that resulted from the 
failure of international court personnel to understand such aspects 
of local culture as taboos and superstitions,228 sexual mores,229 and 
patterns of demeanor and speech.230 Lawyers and judges at 
international, hybrid, and foreign courts have been confused by 
witnesses who invoke non-Western understandings of family 
relationships,231 witnesses who refuse to provide direct answers to 
questions involving sensitive topics,232 and witnesses who fail to 
distinguish between events they witnessed and events that had 
been described to them,233 among other things. Of course, such 
confusion is likewise possible in domestic courts of the state where 
                                                                                                     
 227. See generally TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 2 (2009). 
 228. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 89–94. 
 229. See id. at 86–88 (“Cultural taboos surrounding sexual violence have also 
given rise to communication difficulties at the international tribunals.”). 
 230. See id. at 98–100 (“A final arena in which cultural norms can impede 
communication between international witnesses and their Western listeners 
relates to patterns of speech and modes of communication.”); Cryer, supra note 
224, at 428–29 (“The role of culture in witness evaluation and understanding is 
also a matter to which attention should be paid.”). 
 231. See Fofana Transcript, Nov. 8, 2004, supra note 180, at 28 (featuring a 
witness who initially described a woman as her sister but subsequently 
acknowledged that the woman was only a friend); Fofana Transcript, Nov. 11, 
2004, supra note 181, at 110  (presiding judge seeking to clarify witness’s 
testimony about familial relationships); Witteveen, supra note 7, at 404 
(describing the difficulty of determining whether a witness was the biological 
mother of her son); FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 84–85 
(describing broad notions of family relationships in East Timor that are at odds 
with Western conceptions).  
 232. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 21, ¶ 156 (“[I]t is a particular feature 
of the Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions, 
especially if the question is delicate.”). 
 233. See id. ¶ 155 (“Dr. Mathias Ruzindana noted that most Rwandans live in 
an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, 
often irrespective of whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by 
someone else.”); Musema Judgment, supra note 152, ¶ 103 (“[T]here appears, as 
the Defence argued, to be in Rwandan culture a ‘tradition that the perceived 
knowledge of one becomes the knowledge of all’ . . . .” (citation omitted)); 
Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 49–50 (Mar. 1, 
2005). 
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the crime took place, but it is far less likely to occur when all of the 
courtroom participants hail from the same country.  
Territorial courts are also likely to have a comparative 
advantage when it comes to conducting investigations. Some 
contend that, in international and hybrid courts, “the standards 
for collecting evidence [a]re not as high as in domestic 
jurisdictions, which could generally rely on centuries of practice in 
handling evidentiary issues.”234 But even if the relevant standards 
are comparable, international court investigations are 
comparatively disadvantaged by their distance from the crime 
sites and the unfamiliarity that that distance begets. Some of that 
unfamiliarity relates to the linguistic and cultural issues just 
described. International investigators in the field, like the 
international lawyers in the courtroom, must rely on interpreters 
to communicate with potential witnesses.235 The use of 
interpretation at the investigative stage is at least as likely to 
create factual uncertainty as it does at trial simply because 
interpretation increases the likelihood that factual errors will be 
introduced. In addition, some investigations’ interpreters have 
been found to be incompetent or otherwise inappropriate for their 
positions,236 and witnesses frequently blame interpreters for 
inaccurately interpreting their statements.237 International 
investigators’ cultural unfamiliarity has also been cited as 
negatively impacting investigations.238 Jackson and Brunger, 
                                                                                                     
 234. Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 169. 
 235. FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, supra note 7, at 66. 
 236. See David Cohen, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations 
and the Politics of International Justice in East Timor, in EAST-WEST CENTER 
SPECIAL REPORTS, NO. 9, at 27 (2006) (describing a Special Panels interpreter who 
was in the “very early stages of learning English.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, 
at 17 (Mar. 2, 2005) (discussing a SCSL investigator who used unlicensed 
interpreters who were connected with the witnesses being interviewed). 
 237. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 45 (July 7, 
2005); see Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Transcript, at 100–
02 (Mar. 7, 2005) (maintaining that discrepancies appeared in statements 
because the interpreters “didn’t listen clearly”); Brima Transcript, June 27, 2005, 
supra note 179, at 59;  Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, 
at 50 (Apr. 11, 2002) (“[G]iven the way that interpreter that particular morning 
was doing interpretation, he was confused overall . . . .”); Prosecutor v. 
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Transcript, ¶ 61 (Sept. 19, 2001).  
 238. See Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 174 (“Another set of 
problems . . . concerned the particular challenges in obtaining information from 
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among other scholars, describe international investigators who 
“failed to be culturally sensitive to the situation they were 
investigating, ‘blundering in,’ as one [ICTY staff member] 
described it, by asking a series of inappropriate questions that 
could upset people.”239  
International investigations are also hampered by the literal 
distance between the international courtrooms and mass atrocity 
crime sites. Domestic investigators, by definition, are located in 
country and for that reason, they are able to conduct more 
thorough, less time pressured investigations. International 
investigators, by contrast, frequently must travel long distances to 
reach crimes sites, and must conduct their operations within 
specific, delineated time frames.240 In addition, because most 
international investigators hail from far-off locations, they are 
easily identified as outsiders, so locals may not trust them or may 
fear retaliation if it becomes known that they provided information 
to them.241 Local investigators, by contrast, are less likely to stand 
out, so they can more easily gain access to witnesses and earn the 
trust of local communities. Local investigators, finally, are apt to 
be more familiar with the nuances of the conflict, the parties to the 
conflict, and the impacted local communities;242 thus, they have a 
better sense of where to start, whom to interview, and what to 
ask.243 In recent years, international court investigations have 
                                                                                                     
persons who came from unfamiliar cultures.”). 
 239. Id. (citation omitted).  
 240. See generally WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE 
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 35–36 (2012) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES 
RESEARCH OFFICE]. 
 241. See, e.g., Jackson & Brunger, supra note 85, at 171. 
 242. See Bernard A. Muna, The Early Challenges of Conducting Investigations 
and Prosecutions Before International Criminal Tribunals, OBSERVATIONS AT THE 
COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (Nov. 25–
27, 2004) (stating that local investigators “possess a bank of knowledge about 
criminals in the country and have informers whom they can contact”). 
 243. For instance, Corinne Dufka was charged with educating SCSL 
investigators about important contextual issues regarding the war in Sierra 
Leone, but despite her efforts, many early investigators “remained unfamiliar 
with the basic geographical lay of the land in Sierra Leone, and never quite 
mastered the political power divisions and nature of the conflict between the 
RUF, the AFRC and the CDF.” PENELOPE VAN TUYL, U.C. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES 
STUDIES CTR., EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, AND FAIR?: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICES OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR AT THE SPECIAL 
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been subject to scathing criticism often because they were unable 
to overcome some of the challenges just delineated.244 Domestic 
investigations, though not without their own challenges, do escape 
some of the most significant impediments to accurate fact-finding 
that international and foreign tribunals confront.245 
Finally, we can assume that the factual findings of territorial 
courts are less likely to be distorted by perjured testimony. To be 
sure, perjury occurs in both domestic and international tribunals. 
Ample evidence exists, for instance, that witnesses before the 
ICTR and witnesses before Rwandan domestic courts have 
provided false testimony.246 But there is also reason to believe that 
witnesses are less likely to lie when their lies are more likely to be 
detected, and domestic investigators and judges—due to their 
proximity and familiarity with the conflict and its participants—
are more likely to detect lies. Indeed, Rwanda’s gacaca courts 
dispensed justice “on the grass” in the heart of local communities, 
and one of the most significant perceived advantages of such local 
                                                                                                     
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 50 (2008). 
 244. See Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in 
Belgium, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 400, 416 (2005) (“[W]e wish to cast a critical glance 
on the methods of the International Tribunals’ investigators . . . .”); Alison Des 
Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY 
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS 
ATROCITY 49, 53 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (discussing 
criticisms of ICTR investigations). ICC prosecutors in particular have been the 
target of blistering criticism, most notably from ICC judges. See Ngudjolo 
Judgment, supra note 104, ¶¶ 115–123 (describing deficiencies in prosecutorial 
investigations). Criticism has also come from commentators who have questioned 
the prosecution’s “small team” approach to investigations. See generally WAR 
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 240, at 4–5, 24–30. Additionally, 
commentators have criticized prosecutors’ failure to conduct more in-state 
investigations. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 45–54. Finally, commentators have 
urged ICC prosecutors to adopt a more informed approach to investigations. See 
Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality 
of ICC Investigations, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 5–28 (2014). 
 245. See Buisman, supra note 80, at 45–54 (“As a result of their infrequent 
presence in the crime-base areas, many steps a diligent prosecutor anywhere in 
the world would be expected to take have so far not been taken.”). 
 246. For a discussion of perjury at the ICTR, see Nancy Amoury Combs, A 
New Look at Fact-Finding at the ICTR: Advances in Judicial Acknowledgement, 
26 CRIM. L.F. 387, 392–96 (2016). For Rwandan domestic courts, see Des Forges & 
Longman, supra note 244, at 59 & 66 n.37 (“[F]alse accusations were used to settle 
scores, exact vengeance, or for political purposes.”). 
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justice was its ability to ascertain what actually happened.247 
Proponents of gacaca, in particular, believed that witnesses would 
be less likely to testify falsely—or to get away with it if they did—
when surrounded by their neighbors who could easily contradict or 
refute their falsehoods.248 
All of the factors just described suggest that territorial courts 
have a greater capacity to find accurate facts than fully 
international courts, but as noted at the outset, other fora exist for 
the prosecution of mass atrocities, including foreign courts and 
hybrid domestic/international courts. Turning first to foreign 
courts, reports of practitioners suggest that they experience many, 
if not all, of the same fact-finding challenges that fully 
international courts confront. Martin Witteveen, a Magistrate in 
the District Court of The Hague, for instance, describes witnesses’ 
cultural practices that are unfamiliar to Dutch judges,249 
witnesses’ patterns of speech that are unfamiliar to Dutch 
judges,250 and interpretation difficulties that are even more 
challenging than those that arise in international courts due to the 
difficulty of finding competent interpreters who can translate the 
witnesses’ testimony into uncommon languages such as Dutch.251 
                                                                                                     
 247. See PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND 
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 248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF 
RWANDA’S COMMUNITY BASED GACACA COURTS 28 (2011) (describing the 
expectation that “the local community’s participation at trials would be sufficient 
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 249. Witteveen, supra note 7, at 403. 
 250. See id. at 405–06 (highlighting the cultural issues that had to be 
explained to Dutch judges). 
 251. Id. at 400. As a Human Rights Watch Report described it: 
[S]everal practitioners with experience in extraterritorial investigators 
noted that translation problems hampered their ability to assess the 
reliability of a potential witness’s statement. Belgian investigators who 
traveled to Rwanda relied on local authorities to question witnesses in 
the local language, Kinyarwanda, and commented that it was often 
difficult to determine whether a question was being accurately put to 
the witness. When on one occasion British investigators hired a 
translator in Afghanistan, they discovered upon returning to the UK 
that the translations were inaccurate, forcing them to make another 
trip to Afghanistan with a professional translator in order to re-take 
the statements.  
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Other scholars and practitioners involved in foreign court 
prosecutions of mass atrocities identify similar evidentiary 
challenges.252 Indeed, Belgian officials charged with investigating 
genocide crimes in Rwanda were so aware of the fact-finding 
difficulties facing foreigners that they called upon Rwandan 
officials to conduct the investigations.253 As investigating judge 
Damien Vandermeersch put it, in addition to “an increased 
knowledge of the field and the culture, local authorities could take 
testimony in the witnesses’ language (kinyarwanda), which 
enabled them to corroborate the truth of their statements and 
limited subsequent challenges to the translation, since it was 
always possible to refer to the original statement taken in 
kinyarwanda.”254 
To be sure, important differences in the fact-finding 
competencies of international courts and foreign courts may also 
exist. Domestic criminal justice systems may have more or fewer 
resources than ad hoc international courts, and their 
investigations staff may have more or less training. In addition, 
fact-finding at international courts may be uniquely impeded by 
the fact that they must synthesize the work of staff who are 
recruited from around the world and whose work habits and 
pre-dispositions are necessarily informed by a variety of cultural 
and legal backgrounds. Thus, if we view accurate fact-finding 
capacity as a continuum with territorial courts having the greatest 
capacity, then these differences might, in a particular case, move 
international courts or foreign courts closer to or farther from the 
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 252. See Kamminga, supra note 221, at 959 (describing the practical problem 
of obtaining evidence of offenses committed abroad); Vandermeersch, supra note 
244, at 410 (“Due to the extraneous nature of such cases, administering evidence 
for crimes against international humanitarian law committed abroad is 
particularly cumbersome and requires substantial resources.”); see also Bruce 
Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 399, 412 
(2001) (“The exercise of universal jurisdiction raises special evidentiary 
challenges because the majority of the evidence necessary to make out a case may 
lie in the control of another jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 253. See BHUTA & SCHURR, supra note 251, at 14 (“[A]ll six convictions in the 
two trials of participants in the Rwandan genocide were built on investigations 
carried out in Rwanda by the special Belgian police unit that deals exclusively 
with international crimes.”). 
 254. Vandermeersch, supra note 244, at 413. 
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ideal. However, it is the literal and figurative “distance”—in miles, 
knowledge, culture, and language—between crime site and court 
room that primarily distinguishes international and foreign courts 
on the one hand and territorial courts on the other, and on these 
measures international and foreign courts are largely 
indistinguishable. 
Conceptualizing accurate fact-finding capacity as a continuum 
is also helpful in assessing the relative capacity of hybrid 
tribunals. Admittedly, there is no fixed blueprint for hybrid 
tribunals. Although they are all characterized by having both 
international and domestic components, each tribunal features a 
different amalgam of components, and each amalgam will impact 
the tribunals’ ability to engage in accurate fact-finding. In general, 
however, we can assume that hybrid tribunals with more domestic 
features will enjoy greater fact-finding capacity than hybrid 
tribunals with fewer domestic features. For instance, hybrid 
tribunals that are located in the state where the crime took place 
should gain some of the logistical and investigative advantages 
that territorial criminal justice systems enjoy. Similarly, hybrid 
tribunals that employ judges and lawyers from the state where the 
crimes took place are likely to benefit from the cultural and 
linguistic knowledge of the local personnel. Sierra Leonean and 
Timorese judges and lawyers, for instance, regularly corrected 
interpretation mistakes at the SCSL and Special Panels255 and 
educated their international colleagues when witnesses’ cultural 
inclinations created confusion.256 
 
                                                                                                     
 255. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, 
at 38–39 (Nov. 3, 2004) (featuring a Sierra Leonean judge who repeatedly insisted 
(correctly) that the witness had said “yes” to a question, when the interpreter 
interpreted the witness’s response as “no”); Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, at 48–49 (Mar. 10, 2005) (reporting that, although the 
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 256. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Transcript, at 77–80 
(July 19, 2004) (featuring witness testimony that did not make sense to Western 
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V. Conclusion 
Mass atrocity prosecutions are credited with advancing a host 
of praiseworthy objectives,257 but none of these will be attained 
unless those prosecutions are capable of finding accurate facts. We 
have known for some years that finding those accurate facts can 
prove a challenging enterprise.258 This Article explores why that is 
so and what conditions make it more or less challenging. Just as 
medical researchers identify particularly significant risk factors 
for cancer, heart disease, and other ailments, this Article has 
identified particularly significant risk factors for inaccurate 
factual findings in mass atrocity trials. 
This Article reveals that the proceedings most at risk for 
factually inaccurate findings are international tribunal 
prosecutions of international crimes in developing nations that 
oppose the prosecutions. Some aspects of that finding are 
unsurprising. For instance, no one would be shocked to learn of the 
out-sized role that government opposition plays in creating factual 
uncertainty at trial. Indeed, governmental opposition has been so 
influential a factor that few international prosecutions of mass 
atrocities in developing nations have even been attempted in the 
face of it. The ICC took steps to bring such prosecutions in Kenya, 
Sudan, and Libya, but those steps have dead-ended. Governmental 
opposition has entirely thwarted the ICC’s efforts to prosecute 
                                                                                                     
 257. Some scholars have contended that mass atrocity prosecutions affirm the 
rule of law in previously lawless societies, see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN 
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS 
VIOLENCE 25 (1998) (“To respond to mass atrocity with legal prosecutions is to 
embrace the rule of law.”); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 55–56 (2000) 
(“Criminal justice plays a role not only in delineating individual and collective 
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advance peaceful transitions to democracy in post-conflict nations, see Cassese, 
supra note 222, at 9–10 (asserting that “calling offenders to account” can bring 
about a “return to peaceful relations on the ground”), deter future mass atrocities, 
see Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and 
Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 1, 3–4 (2004), and create a historical record of the 
conflict, see Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS 
ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 
249, 252–53 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on 
International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1998) (discussing the 
advantages of international criminal tribunals). 
 258. Supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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mass atrocities in Sudan and Libya; neither Sudan nor Libya has 
been willing to surrender defendants to the ICC,259 so no trials 
have even begun. The ICC’s efforts to prosecute mass atrocities in 
Kenya advanced slightly farther, but they met a similar fate260 
amidst a plethora of credible claims that prospective witnesses had 
been intimidated261 and even killed.262 The unsurprising 
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al-Islam Gaddafi to the ICC) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC, ICC-02/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), but 
none has been surrendered to the ICC, so no trials can begin. Fatou Bensouda 
(ICC Prosecutor), Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the United 
Nations Security Council on the Situation Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 
(2005), UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icc-
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2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 260. See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public 
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Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013) (same). 
 261. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, Public redacted 
version of: Decision on Defense Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, Reasons 
of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶¶ 141–181 (Apr. 5, 2016) (reporting substantial evidence of 
interference with witnesses). 
 262. See Murithi Mutiga & David Smith, Discovery of Witness’s Mutilated 
Body Feeds Accusations of State Killings, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:55 PM), 
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take-away from this Article’s analysis, therefore, is that 
governments that oppose international court prosecutions not only 
have the power to distort factual findings, they also have the power 
to prevent prosecutions entirely.263   
The surprising conclusion to emerge from this study is that 
the proceedings most at risk for factually inaccurate findings are 
international tribunal prosecutions of international crimes in 
developing nations. This conclusion is not only startling but 
troubling because international criminal tribunals have been 
considered the gold standard institutions for the prosecution of 
mass atrocities. Proponents view them as more neutral than 
domestic courts,264 more legitimate than domestic courts,265 and 
more appropriate for the prosecution of crimes that have global—
and not just domestic—impact.266 To be sure, some scholars have 
                                                                                                     
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/06/witness-mutilated-body-kenya-
government-killing-meshack-yebei-william-ruto (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
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ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 354 (1960-II). 
 265. See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
295, 301–03 (2003) (arguing that hybrid international courts ameliorate some of 
the legitimacy concerns that arise when domestic courts seek to prosecute mass 
atrocities). 
 266. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 
(2007) (describing the view that mass atrocities are “so egregious that they 
victimize all of us and, hence, must be condemned internationally”); Alain Pellet, 
Internationalized Courts: Better than Nothing . . ., in INTERNATIONALIZED 
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 437, 438 
(Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004) (explaining that mass atrocities are of 
concern to the international community as a whole “and it is then important that 
they not be ‘confiscated’ by any particular state including the one in which the 
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contested this vision and highlighted the cost-effectiveness of 
domestic courts267 and their arguably greater credibility in the eyes 
of local communities.268 But most scholars have continued to 
consider international criminal tribunals to be most capable of 
providing the kind of state-of-the-art justice that the international 
community seeks to deliver.  International criminal courts spend 
fantastic sums269 in an effort to uphold their defendants’ due 
process rights and to comply with international human rights 
norms more generally.270 That their prosecutions face an enhanced 
risk of factual inaccuracy is thus a highly unwelcome conclusion.   
Unwelcome or not, it is a conclusion that must be faced. 
Finding accurate facts is not one among a host of equally important 
values: it is arguably the most important, foundational function at 
the core of mass atrocity prosecutions, in whatever form they take. 
                                                                                                     
crime has been committed or of which the victims or the authors are nationals”); 
cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes?, 39 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 27 (2014) (“[T]he central project of international criminal courts is to 
build a normative community . . . .”). 
 267.  See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The 
International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 68 (2008) (“National courts also are 
generally the most cost-effective entities to undertake prosecutions . . . .”). 
 268. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 1 October 1994 From the 
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 134, U.N. 
Doc. S19941125 (Oct. 4, 1994) (opining that domestic courts might be more 
attuned to the needs of local communities and can issue judgments that may have 
“greater and more immediate symbolic force because they were rendered by courts 
familiar to the local community”); José E. Alvarez, Crimes of StateCrimes of Hate: 
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atrocity is paraded before the local press, judged in a local courtroom in a 
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If a mass atrocity trial cannot find facts to an appropriate level of 
certainty, then it cannot legitimately achieve any other goal. 
Consequently, the risk factors identified in this Article should 
inform prosecutorial charging decisions as well as institutional 
design. Although a vast body of literature exists regarding the 
ICC’s selection of cases and situations,271 none of it centers on the 
ICC’s relative fact-finding competence in differing arenas. 
Likewise, although a vast body of literature considers the relative 
merits of different types of criminal justice systems for the 
prosecution of mass atrocities,272 heretofore, these merits have 
rarely included fact-finding competence. But they should. 
Although it might be abstractly preferable to charge mass 
atrocities as international crimes rather than domestic crimes,273 
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(describing the frustration of the East Timorese judge that because all but one of 
the then-current indictments charged domestic crimes); id. at 438 (reporting the 
DECONSTRUCTING THE EPISTEMIC CHALLENGES 299 
perhaps that preference should be reconsidered if it will be harder 
to find the facts of international crimes. Although one case or 
situation may feature arguably graver crimes than another, the 
less grave case or situation should be seriously considered if the 
facts thereof can be found to a higher level of certainty. Finally, the 
selection and design of prosecutorial bodies should be informed by 
their relative fact-finding competence. It is unquestionably 
relevant that a criminal justice system has impartial judges or 
greater resources for criminal defense, but that criminal justice 
system’s capacity to find accurate facts is at least an equally 
important metric on which it should be assessed. 
Fact-finding competence is so foundational that it is often 
taken for granted by scholars and commentators. Scholars theorize 
about the capacity of mass atrocity prosecutions to effect 
deterrence274 or impose retribution,275 but they blithely assume 
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their capacity to find accurate facts, a capacity that necessarily 
underlies the higher-order goals that these commentators seek to 
advance. This Article reveals that fact-finding competence, like 
most important values, is not evenly distributed across different 
kinds of crimes or prosecutions. The careful unpacking of that 
unequal distribution that emerges from this Article should guide 
policymakers henceforth. 
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